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   Abstract* 
We show that the post earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is stronger for conglomerates than 
single-segment firms. Conglomerates, on average, are larger than single segment firms, so it is 
unlikely that limits-to-arbitrage drive the difference in PEAD. Rather, we hypothesize that market 
participants find it more costly and difficult to understand firm-specific earnings information 
regarding conglomerates as they have more complicated business models than single-segment 
firms. This, in turn slows information processing about them. In support of our hypothesis, we find 
that, compared to single-segment firms with similar size, conglomerates have relatively low 
institutional ownership and short interest, are covered by fewer analysts, these analysts have less 
industry expertise and also make larger forecast errors.   Finally, we find that an increase in firm 
complexity leads to larger PEAD and document that more complicated conglomerates have greater 
PEADs. Our results are robust to a long list of alternative explanations of PEAD as well as 
alternative measures of firm complexity. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we examine the relation between innate business complexity (organizational form) 
and price formation by contrasting equity return reactions around earnings announcements for 
conglomerates and single-segment firms.  We have two important findings: (i) conglomerates have 
larger post-earnings announcement drifts than single-segment firms that have the same level of 
surprise unexpected earnings, (ii) and this is attributable to the fact that conglomerates, by virtue of 
operating in multiple industries, have innately more difficult-to-understand business models which 
complicates information processing about them.  
As suggested by Cohen and Lou (2012) there could be various distinct channels through which 
conglomerates’ more complex business models could impede information processing about them. 
This may happen because investors may not possess a detailed understanding of how different 
business segments affect the total revenues of a conglomerate. For example, investors may possess 
detailed knowledge of the weights of different business segments but may lack the ability to predict 
the impact of segment level sales on the value of the conglomerate. This may happen, for example, if 
some segments have high fixed costs while others have mostly variable costs. In such an instance, 
even if one knows the exact sales figures generated by each segment, it would be very difficult to 
predict the impact of the sales figures on profits without understanding the internal cost structure of 
the conglomerate. Either channel would complicate the analysis of conglomerates, slowing down the 
price discovery process about them and leading to under-reaction to earnings news. 
In support of our predictions, first, we show that sophisticated market participants, including 
analysts, institutional investors and short-sellers, find it more difficult to understand conglomerates 
than single-segment firms. Specifically, we find that, once we control for size and other relevant firm-
characteristics, conglomerates, compared to single-segment firms, have relatively low institutional 
ownership and short interest, are covered by fewer analysts, these analysts have less industry expertise 
and also make larger forecast errors. Unconditionally, conglomerates are much larger than single-
segment firms and thus have more institutional ownership and analyst coverage. Controlling for 
determinants of institutional ownership and analyst coverage reveals though that institutions and 
analysts prefer not to deal with conglomerates if a similar single-segment firm is available, indicating 
that complex organizational structures impede information processing. 
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Second, using organizational structure as our proxy for innate business complexity, we find that 
firms with more complicated organizational structures (conglomerates) have larger post-earnings 
announcement drifts compared to simpler firms (single-segment firms). Specifically, we find that 
post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) for an average conglomerate is at least twice as large as it 
is for an average single-segment firm. We attribute our findings to the fact that it is more costly and 
difficult to understand firm-specific earnings information regarding complicated firms and that 
information processing takes more time for complex firms, leading conglomerates to underreact to 
earnings surprises significantly more than single-segment firms. 
Then, we investigate the reason for the larger PEADs for conglomerates. The larger drifts for 
conglomerates could be attributable to either (i) more news released per unit of unexpected surprise 
earnings (SUE) for conglomerates than single-segment firms or to (ii) under-reaction by investors to 
news about conglomerates. In an effort to distinguish the source of the difference in PEADs, we 
contrast the immediate as well as the delayed responses of single-segment firms and conglomerates 
for a hedge portfolio that is long the largest unexpected surprise earnings (SUE) decile and short the 
smallest SUE decile. Our analysis indicates that single-segment firms and conglomerates have similar 
hedge returns in the three days around earnings announcements. Coupled with stronger post-
announcement drifts, this finding might imply more information is generated about conglomerates 
around earnings announcements compared to single-segment firms. Nevertheless, subsequent 
analysis reveals that our finding is not due to more information generation regarding conglomerates 
around earnings announcements but rather due to the fact that conglomerates under-react to earnings 
announcements when compared to single-segment firms. Following DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), 
we define delayed response ratio as the share of the total stock response to announcements that occurs 
with delay.  We find that the delayed response ratio for conglomerates is 59.1%, which is 14.6% more 
than it is for single-segment firms’ 44.5%.  This result suggests that investors have more difficulty 
processing earnings related information regarding conglomerates and that information processing 
takes more time for complex firms, in line with our prediction.   
Next, in an effort to understand if investors really have difficulty interpreting information related 
to more complicated firms we focus on periods during which innate business complexity increases. 
If the level of innate business complexity (conglomerate status) is related to a certain unknown 
variable X that also drives PEAD, then new conglomerates would likely have little exposure to this 
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variable and one would expect new conglomerates to have low levels of PEAD.1 Under our 
hypothesis, however, investors should have the greatest confusion when interpreting earnings 
announcements of new conglomerates, due to the significant and recent change to their complexity 
level. We find that an increase in innate business complexity, defined as a change in the conglomerate 
status, leads to higher PEAD.  In particular, we find that PEAD for new conglomerates is double that 
of existing conglomerates and more than four times that of single-segment firms.  Furthermore, we 
find that the stronger average PEAD for firms that have recently become conglomerates is attributable 
primarily to firms that have created a new line of business from within, without merging with another 
firm from a different industry. 
Finally, we investigate whether the degree of innate business complexity matters in the cross-
section of conglomerate PEAD returns. In doing so we utilize the dispersion in segment earnings 
growth rates, HTSD2, as our proxy for conglomerate complexity. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) present 
a theoretical model which suggests that as long as some investors use a conglomerate’s aggregate 
earnings growth rate, instead of individual segment growth rates, to extrapolate the future value of 
the firm, the firm will be mispriced. The model shows that higher dispersion in segment earnings 
growth rates with respect to the firm’s aggregate growth rate will lead to higher information 
processing costs, which will lead to more mispricing for the firm. We find, consistent with this 
theoretical prediction, that conglomerates with high dispersion in their segments’ growth rates have 
larger post-earnings-announcement drifts.  This finding suggests that a higher degree of complexity 
among conglomerates leads to a higher level of PEAD and further supports the notion that higher 
innate business complexity reduces investors’ ability to interpret publicly available but hard-to-
process information.          
                                                 
1 Imagine that a firm becomes a conglomerate if X exceeds a certain threshold. Then new conglomerates are likely to 
have X close to the threshold, while for old conglomerates it can become much higher than the threshold with time 
(assuming that old conglomerates disband if X drops below the threshold). X also has to be positively related to PEAD, 
because all single-segment firms (conglomerates) in this setup have X below (above) the threshold, and conglomerates, 
as we find, have stronger PEAD. Thus, new conglomerates will have lower X than old conglomerates and therefore lower 
PEAD. 
 
2 In order to calculate HTSD, first we compute the deviation of each segment’s earnings growth rate from the firm’s 
aggregate earnings growth rate and square it. Then, we value weight all segment deviation squared values by the amount 
of sales generated by that segment as a fraction of the total sales of the firm.  Finally, we add up all the squared segment 
deviation values weighed by corresponding sales share values to calculate HTSD.     
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In all of our basic tests we control for the impact of the loss effect (Narayanamoorthy 2006), 
investor sophistication (Bartov, Radhakrishnan and Krinsky 2000), liquidity (Sadka 2006), analyst 
coverage as well as size and market-to-book. Our results are further robust to a long list of alternative 
explanations of PEAD such as potential spillover from the predictability documented in Cohen and 
Lou (2012), the impact of analyst responsiveness (Zhang 2008), the impact of ex-ante earnings 
volatility on earnings persistence (Cao and Narayanamoorthy 2012), the time-varying nature of 
earnings persistence (Chen 2013), as well as the impact of disclosure complexity (Miller 2010, You 
and Zhang 2009, Feldman, Govindaraj, Livnat, and Segal 2010, Lehavy, Li and Merkley 2011, Lee 
2012).3  Furthermore, we find no evidence that conglomerates are more likely to choose Fridays 
(DellaVigna and Pollet 2009) or days with more competing news (Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh 2009) 
to announce their earnings.4  
Our study contributes to two strands of literature. First, we add to the literature on the 
determinants of the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD).  We show that innate business 
complexity induces significant informational frictions that make it more difficult to understand 
earnings related information regarding complex firms. This, in turn, leads to larger PEAD.  
Specifically, we find that conglomerates have post-earnings announcement drifts that are at least 
twice as large as single-segment firms and that conglomerates’ delayed response ratio is 14.6% higher 
than that of single-segment firms. Second, we complement the literature that studies the impact of 
organizational structure on information processing.  Specifically, we document that, compared to 
single-segment firms with similar size and other firm characteristics, conglomerates have relatively 
low institutional ownership and short interest, are covered by fewer analysts, these analysts have less 
industry expertise and they also make larger forecast errors. Although past literature has documented 
the benefits of focus increasing conglomerate spin-offs, evidence is mixed about whether 
conglomerates on average are harder to understand than single-segment firms. This is so, because 
there is evidence suggesting that those conglomerates which choose to break up are the ones that are 
subject to the most severe information dissemination problems (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 
                                                 
3 We investigate whether alternative explanations of PEAD, which could be tied to other dimensions of firm-complexity, 
can explain our results explicitly in Tables 8, 9 and 10. 
 
4 In unreported analyses we also find that our results are robust to controlling for the impact of limits-to-arbitrage 
measured via idiosyncratic volatility (Mendenhall 2004) as well as an alternative measure of investor sophistication 
measured via relative short interest.  
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1999). Since studying focus increasing spin-offs cannot inform us about the information 
environments of those conglomerates which choose not to break up, such studies suffer from a sample 
selection bias. We believe our analyses significantly improve our understanding of the different 
information environments faced by multi-segment and single-segment firms.  These findings should 
be of interest to researchers, analysts and investors interested in the impact of innate business 
complexity on market efficiency. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents hypothesis development.  Section 
3 describes our measure of innate business complexity and other data utilized in this study, and 
provides descriptive statistics.  Section 4 provides our main results.  Section 5 provides a 
comprehensive list of robustness tests.  Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
Prior research has demonstrated the role that corporate focus can play in improving a firm’s 
information environment. The literature has shown that focus-increasing spin-offs, equity carve-outs, 
and targeted stock offerings lead to a significant increase in coverage by analysts that specialize in 
subsidiary firms’ industries as well as an improvement in analyst forecast accuracy for parent and 
subsidiary firms.  Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu (2001) attribute the improvement in analyst forecast 
accuracy following focus increasing spin-offs in part to increased disclosure, as all analysts gain 
access to disaggregated data for the parent and subsidiary firms after the breakup. Gilson et al. (2001) 
find that subsequent to firm spin-offs there is significant incremental improvement in forecast 
accuracy for specialist analysts relative to non-specialists5 suggesting that focus-increasing 
restructurings may reduce analysts’ task complexity (Clement 1999) and may also lead to better 
facilitation of information transfers by analysts with industry expertise (Hilary and Shen 2013). In a 
related paper, Chemmanur and Liu (2011) theoretically show that focus-increasing restructurings 
should lead to higher information production by institutional investors. They attribute the increase in 
information production to two reasons. First, division of consolidated firms into less complex units 
with their own financial reports reduces outside investors' information production costs. Second, 
                                                 
5 An analyst covering a firm is considered a specialist if he/she is also currently covering several firms in the same industry 
(industry affiliation of a conglomerate is determined by the industry affiliation of its larger segment). 
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focus-increasing restructurings allow institutional investors to concentrate their investment in those 
parts of the conglomerate about which they have expertise.  
In a concurrent and relevant paper to Gilson et al. (2001), Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) 
suggest that conglomerates that choose to break-up are those that are subject to the most severe 
information dissemination problems. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) report that the average 
forecast error of a conglomerate that breaks up is four times that of a similar conglomerate that doesn’t 
break up. While it is clear that focus increasing spin-offs lead to better information dissemination for 
those conglomerates that choose to break-up, this is by no means a clear indication that single-
segment firms on average are easier to analyze than multi-segment firms in the full cross-section of 
stocks. Thus, we believe it is important to investigate if it is indeed more difficult to understand 
conglomerates than single-segment firms by directly comparing their information environments. 
Such a direct comparison of the information environments of conglomerates and single-segment 
firms, however trivial it may seem, has rarely been conducted in the past literature. To the best of our 
knowledge, the only paper that investigates this question in the full cross-section is by Thomas (2002) 
which studies the impact of conglomeration on analyst forecast errors over the 1986-1995 time period. 
Thomas’ results are in direct opposition to our hypothesis as he empirically finds that conglomerates 
(single-segment firms) have lower (larger) analyst forecast errors on average in his sample. This 
finding could be attributable to the short time period he studies or due to his list of controls, as we 
find the relationship between conglomerate status and analyst forecast errors to be positive as we 
expect, but statistically insignificant, for this time period. Given the counter-intuitive findings in 
Thomas (2002) as well as the sample selection biases suffered by the literature that studies 
conglomerate spin-offs, it is fundamentally an empirical question whether analyst forecast errors are 
larger for conglomerates or single segment firms in the larger cross-section, over a longer timer-
series. 
In a seminal paper, Cohen and Lou (2012) find that conglomerates take longer to incorporate 
industry-wide shocks into their prices compared to single-segment firms. In particular, Cohen and 
Lou (2012) find that returns to pseudo-conglomerates, made up of single-segment firms, predict the 
returns to actual conglomerates one month ahead, which indicates that conglomerates take an extra 
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month to incorporate industrywide shocks into their prices.6 Our paper builds on the arguments used 
by Cohen and Lou (2012) and expands on their analyses by investigating how investors process a 
large chunk of information about the complicated firm itself (earnings announcement), instead of 
looking at how they process the information about the industries the complicated firm operates in as 
in Cohen and Lou (2012). The challenges faced by the investors in our setup, i.e., disaggregating the 
earnings announcement into information about different segments, are different from the challenges 
investors face in the Cohen and Lou analysis, i.e., aggregating industry-level news about segments to 
revise the valuation of the conglomerate. Nevertheless, we propose that the channels through which 
innate business complexity impedes information processing about the firm are similar to the channels 
suggested in Cohen and Lou (2012).  
Our first hypothesis suggests that an average conglomerate is more difficult to understand for 
investors than an average single segment firm because its business model is more complicated. More 
specificallyinvestors could face difficulty determining the impact of segments with differing business 
characteristics and gross margins on the net profits of the conglomerate. Hence, we predict that, in 
the absence of detailed segment level information such as knowledge about gross margins, it will be 
significantly more difficult to interpret conglomerates’ earnings news compared to single-segment 
firms. Thus, we hypothesize that conglomerates’ innate business complexity impedes information 
processing about them and that this in turn reduces the willingness of sophisticated investors to invest 
or trade in multi-segment firms, ultimately slowing down the price discovery process for multi-
segment companies. In particular, the second hypothesis states that, all else equal, conglomerates are 
expected to have lower institutional ownership, lower short interest, lower turnover, less analyst 
coverage, and higher analyst forecast errors. 
Our second hypothesis builds directly on our first one and states that firms with greater innate 
business complexity (conglomerates) should have larger PEADs compared to simpler firms (single-
segment firms) due to the slower and more difficult price discovery process. It takes longer to 
impound the performance of distinct business units into the price of a conglomerate than it takes to 
reflect the effect of earnings related news in the price of a single-segment firm. Consequently, we 
                                                 
6 Pseudo-conglomerate return replaces real segments of a conglomerate by average returns to all single-segment firms in 
their industry and then takes the weighted average of these industry returns using the weights of the real segments in the 
conglomerate.  
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expect an under-reaction to earnings related news for conglomerates compared to single segment 
firms, followed by a larger drift.  
Our third hypothesis implies that the larger PEADs observed for conglomerates are not 
attributable to conglomerates releasing more news per unit of SUE but rather due to a genuine 
difficulty of processing firm-specific earnings information regarding conglomerates. We test the 
validity of the third hypothesis by contrasting the immediate return reactions and delayed response 
ratios for single-segment firms and conglomerates for a hedge strategy that goes long in the largest 
SUE decile and short in the smallest SUE decile.   
Our fourth hypothesis formulates that the degree of complexity affects the magnitude of PEAD. 
We support our fourth hypothesis by showing that an increase in firm complexity leads to higher 
PEAD and by documenting that more complicated conglomerates have larger PEADs than less 
complicated conglomerates.   
To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical research on the relation between innate 
business complexity (organizational structure) and the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) 
anomaly. The literature on PEAD largely focuses on how capital market characteristics such as 
information production by the firm, information uncertainty and the information processing of 
investors can offer an understanding of the post-earnings announcement drift. Although firm 
complexity could be measured by one or more of the above proxies, these proxies could also be 
affected by factors other than innate business complexity such as managers’ actions to distort 
information. The number of segments (conglomerate status) which is an input-based measure, as 
opposed to output based measures like noisy earnings and return volatility, can thus help us to better 
identify innate business complexity.7 Furthermore, as multi-segment firms, on average, tend to be 
larger, more liquid, less volatile, and more transparent, if information processing about them is indeed 
more complicated, then the economist should attribute this to the complexity of their operations and 
not to alternative explanations such as information uncertainty. Finally, using conglomeration as our 
proxy for complexity should allow us to include a more extensive array of control variables in our 
analyses reducing endogeneity concerns. 
                                                 
7 We thank an anonymous referee for helping us in elaborating the distinctness of innate business complexity. 
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In an attempt to establish the uniqueness of our results we need to control for alternative 
explanations for PEAD. In a recent paper Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2012) document that post-
earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is a function of both the magnitude of an earnings surprise 
(SUE) and its persistence.  Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2012) show that, contrary to the expectations 
of the market, firms with higher (lower) ex-ante earnings volatility have lower (higher) earnings 
surprise (SUE) persistence and document that PEAD returns due to earnings volatility are 
concentrated in firms with the smallest trading frictions, i.e. those firms that have the lowest ex-ante 
earnings volatility.  Since conglomerates, on average, have smaller trading frictions than single-
segment firms we control for the impact of ex-ante earnings volatility (EarnVol) on PEAD and 
document that our results are virtually unchanged and as such are distinct from the impact of ex-ante 
earnings volatility on PEAD studied in Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2012).   
In another paper that investigates the impact of information complexity on PEAD, Chen (2013) 
documents that investors have difficulty understanding the time-varying nature of earnings 
persistence and their failure to incorporate this characteristic into the accounting and economic 
fundamentals leads to the post-earnings announcement drift. If there is a systematic difference in the 
time-varying nature of earnings persistence between single-segment firms and conglomerates, then 
such a difference could explain our findings. We find that controlling for the impact of time-varying 
earnings persistence (EP) documented in Chen (2013) slightly reduces the coefficient on the 
interaction of SUE with the conglomerate dummy but our main results are largely unchanged 
suggesting that the impact of innate business complexity, measured via organizational structure, on 
PEAD is distinct from the impact of time-varying earnings persistence on PEAD.   
Next, we investigate whether varying analyst responsiveness for conglomerates and single-
segment firms could explain our results. Following Zhang (2008), we construct a measure of analyst 
responsiveness (DRESP) and investigate whether its interaction with SUE could reduce the economic 
and statistical impact of business complexity on PEAD. Our results suggest that the impact of DRESP 
on PEAD cannot explain our main findings, either.   
Then, we test if the impact of innate business complexity (conglomerate status) on PEAD could 
be explained by informational frictions associated with disclosure complexity. In a relevant study, 
Lee (2012) finds that, for the same level of earnings surprise, investors first underreact and then 
respond in the direction of the surprise with a delay to 10-Q filings if a given 10-Q is textually more 
complicated. Since 10-Q’s are filed at a date later than the actual earnings announcements, Lee (2012) 
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is not a direct investigation of the impact of disclosure complexity on PEAD. Following Li (2008) 
we construct the Gunning FOG index as our proxy for disclosure complexity, and analyze its direct 
impact on PEAD. To our surprise, we find that the interaction of surprise unexpected earnings (SUE) 
with firm-level textual complexity (FOG) predicts PEAD with a negative sign when we control for 
the impact of organizational structure on PEAD. This result would suggest that our results are not 
affected by the impact of disclosure complexity. 
Finally, we contend that the effect we study is distinctly different from results in Cohen and Lou 
(2012) who investigate how industry-wide news is incorporated into the prices of single-segment 
firms and conglomerates. To distinguish the impact of innate business complexity on returns 
attributable to firm-specific news, from the impact of innate business complexity on returns 
attributable to industry-wide news, we specifically control for potential spillover from the 
predictability documented in Cohen and Lou (2012). Our results suggest that larger PEADs for 
conglomerates are distinct from the predictability documented in Cohen and Lou (2012).     
 
3. DATA 
We use three measures of innate business complexity. The first measure, Conglo, is the 
conglomerate dummy, equal to 1 if the firm is a conglomerate and 0 otherwise. The firm is deemed 
to be a conglomerate if it has business divisions in two or more different industries, according to 
Compustat segment files. Industries are defined using two-digit SIC codes. The second measure of 
complexity, NSeg, is the number of divisions with different two-digit SIC codes. The third measure, 
Complexity, is a continuous variable based on sales concentration. Complexity equals 1-HHI, where 
HHI is the sum of sales shares of each division squared, HHI=∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1
, where sales share, si, for each 
division is the fraction of total sales generated by that division. According to the third definition of 
complexity, a firm with sales in a single segment would have an HHI of 1 and a Complexity measure 
of 0, whereas a firm with sales in a large number of industries could achieve a Complexity score close 
to 1. 
Our measure of PEAD is the slope from the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression of cumulative post-
announcement returns on earnings surprises. Post-announcement cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) are cumulated between trading day 2 and trading day 60 after the earnings announcement. 
CARs are size and book-to-market adjusted following Daniel et al. (1997) (also known as DGTW). 
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Earnings announcement dates are from COMPUSTAT, and daily returns are from CRSP daily files.  
We measure earnings surprise as standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), defined as the difference 
between earnings per share in the current quarter and earnings per share in the same quarter of the 
previous year, scaled by the share price for the current quarter.8 Since we calculate SUE and PEAD 
values as in Livnat and Mendenhall (2004) we use the same sample selection criteria. In doing so, we 
restrict the sample to firm-quarter observations with price per share greater than $1 as of the end of 
quarter t in an effort to reduce noise caused by small SUE deflators. We also keep only those 
observations with non-negative book value of equity at the end of quarter t-1, while excluding those 
observations with market value of equity less than $5 million at the end of quarter t-1.   
Our sample period is determined by the availability of the segment data and lasts from January 
1977 to December 2010.  All other variables are defined in the Data Appendix.   
 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics, Organizational Structure and Limits to Arbitrage 
Complex firms tend to be larger, more liquid, less volatile, and more transparent and as such they 
are expected to have lower limits to arbitrage. In this section, we empirically verify the relationship 
between firm complexity and the traditional measures of limits to arbitrage.  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the full distribution of SUE, Complexity=1-HHI, and the number of 
segments for all firms and for conglomerates only. A few numbers are particularly noteworthy. First, 
it is important to note that SUE changes by 0.139 (0.064 minus -0.075) between the 95th and the 5th 
percentiles and by 0.274 (0.129 minus -0.145) between the 97.5th and the 2.5th SUE percentiles – 
this information will be used later to evaluate the economic magnitude of the SUE slope in the Fama-
MacBeth regressions of post-announcement CAR on SUE. Second, we notice that most firms in our 
sample are not conglomerates (the median number of segments in the full sample is 1) and most 
conglomerates have two segments (the median number of segments for conglomerates is 2 except for 
a few years early in the sample).9 A relatively large number of conglomerates report three segments 
and some have four segments, whereas conglomerates with five or more segments make up less than 
                                                 
8 In unreported tables, calculating SUE as the deviation from consensus analyst forecasts, we find results that are 
qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with our main findings. 
 
9 In untabulated results, we find that 27% of firms in the sample are conglomerates. This number varies from 47% in the 
late 1970s to 17% in the late 1990s back to 25% in the 2000s. 
 
12 
 
 
2.5% of the full sample (and thus less than 10% of all conglomerates). Third, the distribution of 
complexity suggests that there is a significant number of low-complexity firms. For example, a two-
segment firm, for which one of the segments accounts for 95% of the revenues, would have a 
complexity measure of 0.095. This level of complexity is comparable to the 10th complexity percentile 
among conglomerates, which is only 0.079. A two-segment firm, for which one of the segments 
accounts for 90% of sales, has a complexity measure of 0.18.  This level of complexity is comparable 
to the 25th complexity percentile among conglomerates.  These observations suggest that even small 
segments are reported in Compustat Segment files and that we are not lumping together single-
segment firms with conglomerates that have many small unreported segments. 10  
The rest of Table 1 compares the firm characteristics of single-segment firms and multi-segment 
firms (conglomerates). 
In Panel B, we summarize earnings surprises (SUE) and announcement returns (CAR(-1;1)) for 
the two types of firms specified as above. CAR(-1;1) is size and book-to-market adjusted as in 
DGTW. Panel B1 reports the mean CAR values, in an attempt to assess whether conglomerates, on 
average, have more positive earnings surprises, and Panel B2 reports the means of absolute values of 
CAR(-1;1), testing whether earnings surprises experienced by conglomerates are different in 
magnitude.   
We find in Panel B1 that SUEs of the two firm groups (single-segment and multi segment) are, 
on average, positive at 0.156% and 0.155% of the stock price, respectively, and that conglomerates 
have somewhat more positive CARs, but the difference is never statistically significant.  
Panel B2 shows that the magnitude of the announcement CARs is significantly smaller for 
conglomerates than it is for single-segment firms, whereas the average absolute magnitude of SUE is 
similar for both groups of firms. While the first result is not surprising, since conglomerates are 
significantly larger and thus less volatile than single-segment firms, the second one (similar SUE 
magnitude despite different size) offers a preview of our findings in the next section that 
conglomerates have poor analyst coverage compared to single-segment firms of the same size. The 
smaller absolute CARs of conglomerates, coupled with similar SUE of conglomerates and single-
                                                 
10 The number of firms in quarterly Compustat files is larger than the number of firms reported in Compustat segment 
files, because single-segment firms and firms with relatively small segments do not have to report segment data. In our 
main analysis, we do not use the firms covered by Compustat quarterly, but rather those covered by Compustat segment 
files, because we cannot exclude the possibility that such firms have small unreported segments. However, we confirm 
that our main results remain qualitatively intact if we assume that all firms that are on Compustat quarterly, but not on 
Compustat segment files are single-segment firms. 
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segment firms, are also suggestive that the stronger PEAD for conglomerates is unlikely to imply that 
conglomerates experience more information revelation at earnings announcements. 
Panel C summarizes the median values of several liquidity measures for single-segment firms, 
and multi-segment firms. The first three - the Gibbs measure (Hasbrouck, 2009), the Roll (1984) 
measure, and the effective spread estimate of Corwin and Schultz (2012) estimate the effective bid-
ask spread. We find that the bid-ask spread of a representative conglomerate is roughly one-third to 
two-thirds lower than the bid-ask spread of a representative single-segment firm. The fourth liquidity 
measure, the Amihud (2002) measure, estimates the price impact and shows that conglomerates 
experience 50% less price impact when compared to a representative single-segment firm. The last 
measure is a catch-all trading cost measure from Lesmond et al. (1999). This measure calculates the 
fraction of zero-return days in each firm-year and assumes that stocks are not traded when the trading 
costs are higher than the expected profit from trading. Thus, a greater fraction of zero-return days is 
synonymous with higher trading costs. We find that for conglomerates the median number of zero-
return days is 11.8%, as opposed to 14.1% for single-segment firms and that the difference is 
statistically significant.  
In summary, all liquidity measures in Panel C strongly suggest that conglomerates are 
significantly more liquid than single-segment firms. Thus, the liquidity measures suggest that if the 
link between PEAD and complexity were driven by liquidity effects, then PEAD would be stronger 
for single-segment firms, contrary to our hypothesis. This observation also suggests that, controlling 
for the interaction between PEAD and liquidity would make the relation between PEAD and 
complexity economically even more significant.  
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Information Production for Conglomerates and similar Single-segment firms  
Our analysis in Table 1 suggests that conglomerates have lower limits to arbitrage. Nevertheless, 
building on our first hypothesis that conglomerates have greater innate business complexity and as 
such are more difficult to understand, we predict that analysts will be discouraged from following 
conglomerates while sophisticated investors will be less likely to invest and trade in them. As a result 
we predict that there will be less information production about multi-segment firms compared to 
single-segment firms. 
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In Table 2, we analyze the link between firm complexity and information production about the 
firm by comparing single-segment firms and conglomerates across several dimensions. We 
specifically investigate the impact of innate business complexity on the information production by 
equity analysts, institutional investors and short sellers. Furthermore, we also investigate the 
differences in accounting disclosure quality of conglomerates and single-segment firms using 
segment disclosure quality as in Franco, Urcan, and Vasvari (2015). Institutional ownership (relative 
short interest) is the number of shares held by institutions (number of shares shorted) divided by 
number of shares outstanding. For analyst coverage, in addition to utilizing the traditional measure 
of analyst coverage, the number of analysts following the firm, we also measure the quality of the 
coverage by analyzing the number and fraction of specialists following the firm. An analyst following 
a firm is categorized as a specialist in that quarter, if the analyst covers five or more firms in the same 
industry in a given quarter (we use both two-digit and three-digit SIC codes to define an industry). 
For a conglomerate, specialists are defined using the industry affiliation of its main segment.  
Size potentially has a large confounding effect on the link between firm complexity and 
information production about the firm. Larger firms are known to attract more attention of analysts 
and institutions, and conglomerates are roughly twice as large as single-segment firms are. While 
conglomerates are harder to understand due to their business complexity, the benefits of 
understanding conglomerates can be greater due to their larger size. Thus, in order to assess how 
business complexity impacts information production, we have to control for size by comparing 
conglomerates to single-segment firms of similar size.  
In Panel A of Table 211, we distribute conglomerates and single-segment firms into size deciles 
formed using CRSP breakpoints. While this method of controlling for size is imperfect, it turns out 
powerful enough to elicit that conglomerates have less analyst coverage and their coverage is of lower 
quality than that of single-segment firms. In all size deciles, conglomerates are followed by fewer 
analysts and fewer specialists. We also observe that a smaller percentage of analysts covering 
conglomerates are specialists. The biggest difference is in the number of specialists, as single-
                                                 
11 We test for the statistical significance of the difference between single segment firms and conglomerates separately in 
each size decile for all variables analyzed in Table 2. Differences for all analyst coverage variables, forecast error, segment 
disclosure quality, turnover and relative short ratio were almost universally statistically significant at the one percent level 
in all size deciles. The differences in institutional ownership between conglomerates and single-segment firms were 
almost universally not statistically significant across size deciles. The differences in forecast dispersion were statistically 
significant in the larger size deciles. 
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segment firms have 25% to 40% higher percentage of specialists. Both the relative and absolute 
differences in analyst coverage peak in size deciles six to eight, suggesting that conglomerates which 
suffer from relatively low quality coverage are relatively large firms and are not obscure micro-cap 
multi-segment firms.  
Once we control for size we also find that conglomerates suffer from larger analyst forecast errors 
due to the lower quality and the quantity of analyst coverage they receive. As the seventh row of 
Panel A suggests, conglomerates have larger analyst forecast errors in all size deciles but one (decile 
two), and the difference is material: on average, conglomerates have 15% larger forecast errors 
compared to single-segment firms controlling for size. Once again, the difference is mainly observed 
in the deciles with the largest conglomerate population: the differences in forecast errors are 
particularly large, in relative terms, in size deciles seven, nine and ten. Not only do we find the 
forecast errors to be larger for conglomerates compared to single-segment firms of similar size, but 
we also find the forecast dispersion / analyst disagreement regarding conglomerates is also larger 
(except for the two smallest size deciles). 
Further supporting our hypothesis, we find that institutional investors and short sellers also find 
processing information about conglomerates harder. Before controlling for size (see Panel B1), 
conglomerates have significantly more institutional ownership compared to single-segment firms. 
Sorting firms into size-deciles, however, leads to a significantly different conclusion. We find that 
while in size-deciles five, six and seven conglomerates have more institutional ownership, the 
opposite is true in size deciles eight, nine and ten. We observe similar patterns regarding share 
turnover and relative short interest, as the difference in short interest (turnover) between single-
segment firms and conglomerates increases with firm size, suggesting that institutions, short sellers, 
and stock traders in general tend to avoid conglomerates if single-segment firms of comparable size 
are available. Taken together, our analyses suggest that there is less information production about 
conglomerates compared to single-segment firms of similar size and that the relative difficulty of 
information processing is especially higher for larger conglomerates. 
In Panel B2, we control for size in a different way: we match each conglomerate to a single-
segment firm with the closest market cap. We observe again, consistent with Panel A, that 
conglomerates are followed by 1-2 analysts and specialists less than single-segment firms of 
comparable size, which constitutes a difference of 20-30% in the quality of analyst coverage. In terms 
of fraction of specialists, we find, for example, that on average 70% of analysts covering a single-
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segment firm specialize in its three-digit SIC industry, but only 57% of analysts covering a 
conglomerate specialize in the three-digit SIC industry of its main segment. All differences in analyst 
coverage are highly statistically significant and are observed in the vast majority of quarters. 
As a consequence of lower quality analyst coverage, Panel B2 also reports that analyst forecast 
error is 18% higher for conglomerates than it is for single-segment firms of the same size, and the 
difference is significant with a t-statistic of 3.29. A similar result is observed for analyst forecast 
dispersion as forecast dispersion is 33% higher for conglomerates than it is for single-segment firms 
of the same size (.24 vs .18), and the difference is significant with a t-statistic of 3.24.  
We find similar patterns for institutional ownership, relative short interest12 and turnover. While 
before size-matching the average conglomerate has 3.8% more institutional ownership, after size-
matching, the level of institutional holding is indistinguishable between conglomerates and single 
segment firms.  Similarly, the difference in the relative short interest (RSI) in single-segment firms 
and conglomerates also increases after size-matching. Before-size matching average RSI for 
conglomerates is 2.2%, while it is 2.5% for single-segment firms for a 0.3% difference in favor of 
single-segment firms. After size-matching this difference becomes even more severe and increases 
to 0.5%. A very similar pattern is observed for turnover, as before-size matching it is 0.6% higher in 
favor of single-segment firms, but size-matching increases this difference to 1.4%. 
Significant differences between Panels B1 and B2 illustrate the importance of controlling for size 
when comparing conglomerates and single-segment firms for variables related to information 
production. If we do not match by size, we find that information production about conglomerates, 
due to their larger market cap, is greater at least according to some measures. Panel B1 suggests that 
conglomerates have lower limits to arbitrage, and thus the stronger PEAD for conglomerates is 
unlikely to pick up the well-known relation between PEAD and limits to arbitrage (Bartov et al., 
2000, Mendenhall, 2004, etc). Panel B2 looks at a particular wrinkle that is central to our story, 
                                                 
12 Short interest can also reflect a directional bet, but this consideration works against us finding that short sellers avoid 
conglomerates, like institutions and analysts do. A long literature on the conglomerate discount, starting with Lang and 
Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995), finds that conglomeration is, on average, value-destroying, and leads to 
conglomerates having worse operating performance and lower price multiples. Barinov (2018) further shows that 
conglomerates, on average, underperform by 3-6% per annum on the risk-adjusted basis. Hence, conglomerates should 
be attractive shorting targets everything else fixed, and the fact that we find the opposite result is a strong indication that 
complexity matters. 
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information production, and finds that the conglomerate status implies, all else equal, less attention 
from analysts and sophisticated investors. 
In Panel C, we run panel regressions that include more controls beyond just size as in Panel B, 
to better illustrate the role organizational structure plays on analyst coverage, institutional ownership, 
turnover and relative short interest.13 In doing so, in addition to firm size, we control for market-to-
book, CAPM-beta, lagged returns, momentum returns, share price, capital structure, firm-age and 
other firm-characteristics deemed relevant by the existing literature where necessary.14 Most 
importantly in all of our regressions we account for the impact of geographic complexity on the firm’s 
information environment. Geographic complexity, (GeoMulti), is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the firm generates its sales from a multitude of geographic segments and zero if the firm generates all 
of its sales from the same geographic segment. It is important to understand the differential impact of 
geographic complexity and control for its impact on PEAD, as some previous studies suggest it as a 
proxy for business complexity.15 Our analyses reveal that while operating in multiple business 
segments leads to a deterioration of the information environment of the firm, the same cannot be said 
for firms that operate in multiple geographies. While the coefficient on the conglomerate dummy is 
negative in columns (1), (3), (4) and (5), indicating that conglomerates have lower analyst coverage, 
institutional ownership, turnover and relative short interest, the coefficient on GeoMulti, our proxy 
for geographic complexity, is positive in these four columns. Furthermore, we find a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient on Conglo in column (2), whereas the coefficient on GeoMulti is 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that innate business complexity leads to larger analyst forecast 
errors but geographic complexity has no effect on forecast accuracy. Taken together, these results 
suggest that while organization complexity (innate business complexity) has an adverse effect on the 
information environment of the firm, the same is not true for the impact of geographic complexity.  
                                                 
13 For the panel regressions we run Panel C of Table 2 we cluster standard errors by firm-year, following Peterson (2009). 
 
14 The turnover regression uses the control variables from Chordia et al. (2007), the institutional ownership regression 
follows Gompers and Metrick (2001), and the short interest regression follows Barinov and Wu (2014). 
 
15 For example, Duru and Reeb (2002) study the impact of international diversification on analyst accuracy and report 
that prior to year 2000 analyst forecast accuracy is lower for firms with internationally more diverse operations. In 
unreported results we replicate and extend Duru and Reeb (2002) and find no evidence that international diversification 
reduces analyst forecast accuracy in the post-2000 period. Furthermore, we find that innate business complexity, measured 
using conglomerate status, is associated with lower analyst accuracy, in line with our main hypothesis. 
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In summary, in Table 2, we find that while a representative conglomerate is covered by somewhat 
larger number of analysts than a representative single-segment firm due to the conglomerate being 
much larger, this extra coverage is of poor quality, since it comes primarily from non-specialists and 
probably even dilutes the average analyst quality. Controlling for the confounding effect of size 
makes the negative relation between firm complexity and the quality of analyst coverage really stand 
out: when compared to single-segment firms of similar size, conglomerates are followed by a fewer 
number of analysts and specialists, and those analysts make larger forecast errors. Lower information 
quality production about conglomerates compared to single-segment firms of similar size is not 
confined to analysts. We also find that institutional investors and short-sellers face similar difficulty 
understanding conglomerates and thus refrain from investing or trading in them. We conclude that 
the complex nature of operating in multiple lines of business makes conglomerates significantly more 
difficult to understand in the eyes of market participants including equity analysts, institutional 
investors and short sellers. Next, we investigate how the market reacts to firm-specific information 
about conglomerates and single-segment firms. 
 
4.2 Main Result: Business Complexity leads to higher Post Earnings Announcement Drift 
Table 3 presents our main results, as we study the relation between PEAD and innate business 
complexity. We perform Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions with post-announcement cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR(2;60))16 on the left-hand side and earnings surprise (SUE) and its interaction 
with alternative measures of innate business complexity on the right-hand side: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅2;60 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1 ∙ 𝑆𝑈𝐸0 +  𝛾2 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦0 + 𝛾3 ∙ 𝑆𝑈𝐸0 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦0 
 
Our measure of PEAD is the (positive) slope on SUE. Higher values of complexity measures 
utilized in this study correspond to a higher degree of complexity by construction. In this context 
observing a stronger PEAD for complex firms is associated with finding a positive coefficient on the 
interaction of SUE and innate business complexity.17   
                                                 
16 We use size and book-to-market adjusted abnormal returns as in DGTW. 
 
17 We contrast single segment firms’ and conglomerates’ PEAD returns for comparable levels of earnings surprises in an 
effort to understand whether investors take longer to process the same amount of information when they are confronted 
with more complex firms. A positive loading on the interaction of innate business complexity with SUE, however, would 
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The literature on price momentum (see, e.g., Lee and Swaminathan, 2000, Lesmond et al., 2004, 
Zhang, 2006, and others) finds a puzzling absence of momentum for microcaps (stocks in the lowest 
NYSE/AMEX market cap quintile). Consequently, all results that momentum is stronger for firms 
with higher limits to arbitrage hold only in the sample with microcaps excluded.  Since PEAD and 
price momentum are two related anomalies, we choose to exclude microcaps from our analysis as 
well. Another benefit of excluding microcaps is that microcaps are dominated by single-segment 
firms, and our regression analysis that compares PEAD for single-segment firms and conglomerates 
would have virtually no basis for such a comparison among microcaps.  
The first column in Table 3 estimates PEAD in the pairwise regression of CAR(2;60) on SUE. 
The regression estimates that the difference in SUE between the 97.5th and 2.5th (95th and the 5th) 
SUE percentiles implies a CAR of 2.79% (1.42%) in the three months following the announcement. 
In the second column, we perform the first test of our main hypothesis by regressing CARs on 
SUE, the conglomerate dummy, and the interaction of SUE and the conglomerate dummy.  The 
interaction of the conglomerate dummy and SUE is highly significant and suggests that for 
conglomerates PEAD is 3.86% (1.96%) greater per three months than it is for single-segment firms 
when we estimate the difference in the PEADs by using the SUE differential between the 97.5th and 
the 2.5th (95th and 5th) SUE percentiles.  
The third column estimates the relation between PEAD and conglomerate status controlling for 
the effects of market-to-book (MB), size (Size), institutional ownership (IO), loss effect (Loss), 
liquidity (Amihud), analyst coverage (# Analysts) and the interaction of this large set of controls with 
SUE. The third column verifies some of the previous findings in the literature as the interaction of 
SUE with Amihud is positive and statistically significant (verifying the relationship between 
illiquidity and PEAD), while the interactions of SUE with the number of analysts and the loss dummy 
are negative and statistically significant (verifying the impact of the loss effect as well as the impact 
of analyst coverage on PEAD). We find that controlling for the interactions of SUE with additional 
firm characteristics that may impact PEAD slightly reduces the loading on the interaction term 
between SUE and the conglomerate dummy from 0.141 to 0.129.  
                                                 
also imply a tradable strategy as described in Fama (1976), who shows in Chapter 9 that slopes from Fama-MacBeth 
regressions are returns to tradable portfolios.  In Table 5 and columns 7-9 of Table 10, we further study the tradability of 
this strategy using portfolios. 
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Columns (4) and (5) repeat the analyses conducted in columns (2) and (3), and replace the 
conglomerate dummy with the continuous complexity measure Comp, 1-HHI. The results in columns 
(4) and (5) are qualitatively similar to the results in columns (2) and (3): more complex firms have 
significantly stronger PEAD for the same level of SUE, and this relation persists when we control for 
market-to-book (MB), size (Size), institutional ownership (IO), loss effect (Loss), liquidity (Amihud), 
analyst coverage (# Analysts) and the interaction of these of controls with SUE. The magnitude of 
the coefficient on the product of SUE and the complexity measure, Comp, suggests that PEAD for 
conglomerates is more than twice as large as the PEAD for single segment firms: the mean level of 
the complexity variable for conglomerates is 0.36818, thus the slope of 0.313 in column (4) would 
estimate the difference in PEADs of a representative single-segment firm and a representative 
conglomerate at 3.15% (1.60%) when the SUE differential between the 97.5th and the 2.5th (95th 
and 5th) percentiles is used in the estimation. 
Columns (6) and (7) use the number of segments (with different two-digit SIC codes) as a proxy 
for complexity. Once again, the interaction term between SUE and complexity, NSeg, is statistically 
significant and the economic significance of the interaction term is little changed after controlling for 
market-to-book (MB), size (Size), institutional ownership (IO), loss effect (Loss), liquidity (Amihud), 
analyst coverage (# Analysts) and the interaction of these of controls with SUE. The magnitude of 
the coefficient on the product of SUE and the number of segments, NSeg, suggests that PEAD for 
conglomerates is roughly twice as large as the PEAD for single segment firms: as the median 
conglomerate has 2.2 segments the slope of 0.069 on SUE*NSeg in column (6) would estimate the 
difference in PEADs of a representative single-segment firm and a representative conglomerate at 
2.27% (1.14%) when the SUE differential between the 97.5th and the 2.5th (95th and 5th) percentiles 
is used in the estimation.19  
 
 
                                                 
18 Complexity of 0.368, or HHI equal to 0.632, roughly corresponds to a two-segment firm with one segment taking 
slightly over 76% of sales, or to a three-segment firm with one segment taking 78% of sales and the other two taking 12% 
and 10% respectively. 
 
19 Results in column (6) of Table 3 would estimate the PEAD return to a representative conglomerate at 4.16% (2.09%) 
vs. 1.89% (0.95%) for a single segment firm when the SUE differential between the 97.5th and the 2.5th (95th and 5th) 
percentiles is used in the estimation. 
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4.3 Controlling for Announcement Effects and Comparison of Delayed Response Ratios 
One possible explanation for why complex firms have stronger PEAD is that the information 
revealed by complex firms on the announcement day takes longer to diffuse. However, an alternative 
explanation would suggest that, for the same level of earnings surprise, more information is revealed 
to the market on the announcement day in the case of more complicated firms. If this indeed is the 
case, then we should see a stronger response around the announcement event followed by a stronger 
drift for firms with more innate business complexity. Empirically, the alternative scenario would 
suggest that regressing announcement returns (CAR(-1;1)) as well as the post earnings announcement 
drift returns (CAR(2;60)) on the interaction of SUE and innate business complexity, would both yield 
a positive coefficient.   
In Panel A of Table 4, we perform OLS regressions of announcement returns (CAR(-1;1)), 
PEAD returns (CAR(2;60)) as well as total earnings reaction returns (CAR(-1;60)) on the top decile 
earnings surprise dummy (SUETop), its interactions with Conglo, market-to-book (MB), size (Size), 
institutional ownership (IO), loss dummy (Loss), illiquidity (Amihud) and analyst coverage (# 
Analysts) as well as the control variables themselves. Following our approach in Table 3, we exclude 
microcaps from the sample. SUETop is 1 for the top SUE decile and 0 for the bottom SUE decile20 
and helps us capture hedge returns to going long on the highest SUE decile and going short on the 
lowest SUE decile. 
Column (1) in the Panel A of Table 4 reveals that the interaction of SUETop with Conglo is 
almost zero (-0.002) and statistically insignificant (t-stat of -0.66). This finding indicates that single-
segment firms and conglomerates have similar hedge returns in the three days around earnings 
announcements. On the other hand, column (2) clearly indicates that a hedge strategy of going long 
on the highest SUE decile and going short on the lowest SUE decile would net larger returns for 
conglomerates than single-segment firms as the interaction of SUETop and Conglo is economically 
(1.5% per quarter) and statistically significant (t-stat of 2.12). In fact, the coefficient on the interaction 
of SUETop with Conglo is comparable in economic magnitude to the coefficient on SUETop itself, 
0.022 vs 0.015, revealing the significant impact innate business complexity has on the level of post 
earnings announcement drift returns. Finally, column (3) shows that overall stock return responses in 
announcement plus post-announcement periods are significantly greater for conglomerates. Taken 
                                                 
20 As in DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), firms outside of the top and bottom SUE deciles are excluded from this analysis; 
the analysis is effectively the analysis of the ten-minus-one decile spread in returns. 
22 
 
 
together, results in Panel A of Table 4 suggest that while conglomerates see more information 
revealed at earnings announcements (see the total response in column 3), the incorporation of all extra 
information is delayed till the post-announcement period (see equal announcement effects in column 
1), i.e., stronger PEAD for conglomerates comes from delayed reaction. 
Next, following DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), we quantify the magnitude of the earnings 
surprise under-reaction for conglomerates. We utilize columns (2) and (3) in Panel A to estimate what 
fraction of information in the earnings announcement is incorporated into stock prices outside of the 
earnings announcement window. In Panel B, we calculate the ratio of the drift return, CAR(2,60), to 
the total earnings reaction return, CAR(-1,60), to measure the delayed response ratio for single-
segment firms and conglomerates. For single segment firms we calculate the delayed response ratio 
by dividing the coefficient on SUETop (0.022) in column (2) by the coefficient on SUETop (0.050) 
in column (3), while the delayed response ratio of conglomerates is the ratio of the sum of coefficients 
on SUETop (0.022) and SUETop*Conglo (0.015) in column (2) to the sum of coefficients on SUETop 
(0.050) and SUETop*Conglo (0.014) in column (3). Standard errors are calculated using the Delta 
method as the delayed response ratio is calculated using parameters from two different models. 
Finally, we calculate the difference in the delayed response ratios for single-segment firms and 
conglomerates for a hedge portfolio that trades in extreme positive (negative) surprise earnings 
deciles. We find that the delayed response ratio for this hedge trade is 59.1% (44.5%) for 
conglomerates (single-segment firms), which is 14.6% more than it is for the delayed response ratio 
faced by single-segment firms. Our analysis lends further support to the interpretation that investors 
have more difficulty processing earnings related information regarding conglomerates and that 
information processing takes more time for complex firms. The portfolio approach adopted to 
measure the delayed response ratio also makes it clear that it is indeed possible to trade on stronger 
PEAD for conglomerates. 
 
4.4 Joint Impact of Innate Business Complexity and Investor Sophistication on PEAD  
Since Bartov et al. (2000), it has been well documented that sophisticated investors’ trading can 
help reduce the level of the post-earnings announcement drift anomaly. Bartov et al. (2000) attribute 
this to unsophisticated investors’ misperception about the process which underlies earnings to be a 
seasonal random walk. They suggest and document that sophisticated investors such as institutions 
understand the pricing implications of earnings surprises better and hence propose and empirically 
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verify that there should be less mispricing and lower PEADs in stocks largely held by sophisticated 
investors.    
In Panel B.2 of Table 2 we show that, controlling for size, single-segment firms and 
conglomerates have similar levels of institutional ownership on average. This would suggest, ex-ante, 
that there is no reason for investor sophistication to impact PEAD differently for single-segment and 
multi-segment firms. Furthermore, we control for the interaction of investor sophistication (IO) with 
firm complexity (Conglo) in all of our analyses and document that our main finding cannot be 
explained by differences in the average investor sophistications of single-segment and multi-segment 
companies.  
In Table 5 we take a step further and analyze the joint impact of innate business complexity and 
investor sophistication on PEAD. In doing so, every quarter we sort stocks into quintiles based on 
their institutional ownership percentage, our proxy for investor sophistication. Then, we run our basic 
regression separately in each quintile. Our results indicate that in quintiles 1 and 2 with low investor 
sophistication PEAD is economically and statistically larger for conglomerates than single segment 
firms, in quintiles 3 and 4 it is economically larger but statistically not different, and in quintile 5 
PEAD for conglomerates is no longer larger, when investor sophistication is at its highest. While 
using smaller sub-sections of the sample may reduce the statistical significance of the interaction 
term, there is a clear pattern in our results. As investor sophistication, the PEAD differential between 
conglomerates and single-segment firms is reduced.  Our results suggest that for the sub-section of 
firms with the largest institutional ownership, sophisticated investors can help fully eliminate the 
adverse effects of innate business complexity on mispricing.   
 
4.5 Impact of Changes to Organizational Form on the Post Earnings Announcement Drift 
While all proxies for limits to arbitrage we considered are negatively related to innate business 
complexity and therefore cannot explain our finding that PEAD is stronger for complex firms, it is 
still possible that complexity and conglomerate status in particular are related to a certain unknown 
variable that in turn affects the strength of PEAD.  
In an effort to understand if investors really have difficulty interpreting information related to 
more complicated firms, we focus on periods during which innate business complexity increases. If 
the level of innate business complexity (conglomerate status) is related to a certain unknown variable 
X that also drives PEAD, then new conglomerates would likely have little exposure to this variable 
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and one would expect new conglomerates to have low levels of PEAD. Indeed, if firms become 
conglomerates once X exceeds a certain threshold (and conglomerates disband after X dips under the 
threshold), new conglomerates will have values of X higher than, but close to the threshold, while 
old conglomerates will also have X above the threshold, but can have X exceed the threshold by a 
lot. Under the complexity hypothesis, however, investors should have the greatest confusion when 
interpreting earnings announcements of new conglomerates, due to the significant and recent change 
to their complexity level.21  
In Table 6, we use a dummy variable for the change in the conglomerate status called 
NewConglo. NewConglo is set to one in the year after the firm switches from having one segment to 
having more than a single segment, continues to be one for another year, and becomes zero 
afterwards. NewConglo is also zero in all years when the firm has only one segment. In an average 
year, we have about 5,000 firms with segment data, about 1,300 conglomerates, and 120-200 new 
conglomerates, for which NewConglo is 1. Thus, new conglomerates comprise 2.5-4% of our sample 
and 10-15% of all conglomerates.  
The first column presents our baseline regression from column (3) of Table 3 (post-
announcement CAR on SUE, the Conglo dummy, Size, BM and the interactions of SUE with Size, 
BM and Conglo) with the NewConglo dummy and its interaction with SUE added.22 The slope on 
the product of SUE and NewConglo estimates the extra PEAD experienced by new conglomerates as 
compared to existing conglomerates, since Conglo is, by definition, always 1 when NewConglo is 1.  
We make two important observations based on the analysis conducted in the first column of 
Table 6.  First, PEAD experienced by existing conglomerates (firms that have been conglomerates 
for more than two years) is more than twice the PEAD experienced by single-segment firms. The 
                                                 
21 We argue that changes to X are associated with organizational structure, i.e. when X exceeds a certain threshold the 
firm becomes a conglomerate. Conglomeration is not the cause of change in X but rather the change in X is indicative of 
conglomeration. There could be a different type of omitted variable Y, separate from X, such that it can increase in 
response to conglomeration and then subside. If such a Y variable is also associated with higher PEAD’s, then PEAD‘s 
would be stronger for new conglomerates. We argue in this paper that Y is firm complexity. Nevertheless, we 
acknowledge that there could be some alternative Y that behaves similar to firm complexity but is fundamentally different. 
While acknowledging that such a Y may offer an alternative explanation of the association between firm complexity and 
PEAD we conclude that it is almost impossible to control for all such alternative scenarios. In conclusion we do not claim 
to solve all omitted variables problems.   
 
22 Since the number of new conglomerates is low, in Table 6 we do not use the extra controls from Table 3 and elsewhere. 
Requiring that new conglomerates have non-missing institutional ownership and analyst coverage data leaves us, in some 
years, with new conglomerates number in low double-digits and even in single digits. 
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regression estimates suggest that PEAD is 1.31% (per three months after the announcement) for 
single-segment firms and 2.32% for existing conglomerates when we use the difference between the 
95th and the 5th percentiles of SUE (see Panel A1 of Table 1) to calculate differences in PEAD23.  
We conclude that controlling for the effect of new conglomerates does not reduce the significance of 
the interaction term between PEAD and the conglomerate dummy. The interaction term is as strong 
as it is in Table 3, which suggests that stronger PEADs for more complex firms cannot be attributed 
solely to firms that recently have become conglomerates.  
Second, we do find that PEAD is significantly stronger for new conglomerates than it is for 
single-segment firms as well as it is for existing conglomerates. The product of SUE and NewConglo 
dummy is statistically significant and its coefficient implies that for new conglomerates PEAD is 
4.7% per three months, almost double that of existing conglomerates and more than four times that 
of single-segment firms.  
How are new conglomerates created? In roughly two-thirds of the cases, we are able to trace the 
increase in the number of segments to M&A activity using SDC data24. In the other one-third of the 
cases it appears that the firm expands from within, starting a new line of business inside the firm.   
In the next two columns we try to estimate the PEADs of new conglomerates formed through 
acquisitions (we replace NewConglo with NewCongloM&A, which equals one only if the change in 
the conglomerate status can be attributed to a merger with a firm from a different two-digit SIC code 
on SDC) and the PEADs of new conglomerates created from within (replacing NewConglo with 
NewCongloNoM&A, which equals one only if the change in the conglomerate status cannot be traced 
back to a corresponding merger).  
We do not have a strong prior regarding whether becoming a new conglomerate through M&A 
activity or via expansion from within leads to more confusion on the part of investors. On the one 
hand, the segment added through M&A activity is more likely to be completely new to the firm 
(whereas the new line of business could have been developing within the firm for several years before 
the firm starts reporting it as a separate segment) and firms may prefer to expand through M&A 
                                                 
23 The estimates of PEAD would be roughly twice in magnitude for both single-segment firms and existing conglomerates 
if we instead use the difference between the 97.5th and the 2.5th percentiles of SUE. These numbers are slightly different 
from our earlier interpretation of Table 3 as in Table 6, we use a smaller set of control variables so the sample is different 
from the sample used in Table 3. 
 
24 SDC data includes both public and private firms; while all our buyers are public companies, when we track the cases 
of adding a new segment to SDC, we include acquisitions of both public and private targets as potential ways of adding 
a new segment through M&A. 
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activity when venturing into more "distant" industries. These considerations would suggest that 
stronger PEADs for new conglomerates would be more attributable to new conglomerates formed 
through M&A activity. On the other hand, both the acquirer and the target receive a lot of scrutiny 
during a merger, and the target also has a history as a stand-alone firm before the merger. Such 
scrutiny and the availability of historical information about the target might suggest that higher 
PEADs for new conglomerates might be driven by new conglomerates that are formed via expansion 
from within rather than those that are formed through M&A activity.  
Results strongly support the latter view. In column (2), which singles out new conglomerates 
that are created through mergers, we find that PEAD is higher only by 0.5% per three months for 
these new conglomerates than it is for existing conglomerates (the difference, measured by the slope 
on the product of SUE and NewCongloM&A, is statistically insignificant).  In column (3) though, 
we focus on new conglomerates that are created from within (i.e., not through a merger), and we 
discover a huge difference in the PEADs of these new conglomerates and the PEADs of existing 
conglomerates. Substituting the difference in SUE between the 95th and the 5th percentiles into the 
regression in the third column, we estimate the average PEAD for single-segment firms at 1.1% (per 
three months after the announcement), the average PEAD of existing conglomerates at 2.3%, and the 
average PEAD of new conglomerates created from within at a whopping 8.8%.  We conclude 
therefore that the stronger average PEAD for firms that have recently become conglomerates is 
attributable primarily to firms that have created a new line of business from within, without merging 
with another firm from a different industry.  
Results in Table 5 strongly suggest that the increase in complexity (defined as the change in the 
conglomerate status) is associated with a large increase in PEAD, consistent with our hypothesis that 
it is firm complexity (and not any other characteristic common to conglomerates) that creates stronger 
PEAD. We also find that investors are most confused about firms that expand from within, i.e. about 
those firms that add segments without being involved in M&A activity. 
 
4.6 Does the Degree of Complexity Matter? Using Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) Measure  
In the previous sections we have established that there is a strong relationship between 
organizational structure and the strength of PEAD. In this section we investigate if PEAD is stronger 
for more complicated conglomerates. In doing so we construct a measure proposed by Hirshleifer 
and Teoh (2003) that enables us to rank conglomerates based on their level of complexity.  
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Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) suggest that the high cognitive processing costs associated with 
analyzing earnings growth at the segment level lead at least some investors to focus on aggregated 
information even if segment level data are available. They propose that even if only some investors 
use aggregate firm earnings growth rates to estimate future firm values, instead of using segments’ 
individual earnings growth rates, these conglomerates will be mispriced.  Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) 
interpret the dispersion of the segment growth rates as a measure of high cognitive processing costs 
due to harder-to-process nature of such information. They suggest that the level of mispricing 
(cognitive processing costs) will increase with the dispersion of the segment growth rates.   
We construct a new empirical proxy of conglomerate complexity following Hirshleifer and 
Teoh’s (2003) measure of cognitive processing costs. We call this measure HTSD (Hirshleifer-Teoh-
Segment-Dispersion) and calculate it as 𝐻𝑇𝑆𝐷 = ∑ (𝐸𝑖 − 𝑓)
2𝑁
𝑖=1 ∗ 𝑆𝑖, for a firm with N segments that 
has an aggregate earnings growth rate of f, where each segment i has growth rate 𝐸𝑖, and sales share 
as a percentage of the firm’s total sales which is equal to 𝑆𝑖.  We also compute log of one plus HTSD, 
LogHTSD, to account for HTSD’s high skewness. 
In Table 7, we focus our analysis on the conglomerate-only sample and investigate if 
conglomerates with higher HTSD have higher PEAD. In the first column of Table 7, controlling for 
the effects of size and market-to-book and their interactions with SUE, we analyze the interaction of 
HTSD with SUE and find that conglomerates with greater segment earnings growth dispersion have 
larger post-earnings announcement drifts compared to other conglomerates for the same level of 
SUE.25 The interaction term is 0.154 and statistically significant.  The interaction term indicates that 
the PEAD returns between the 97.5th and the 2.5th SUE percentiles for a conglomerate that is in the 
top decile based on the segment growth dispersion measure26 would be 1.36% more than the PEAD 
returns between the 97.5th and the 2.5th SUE percentiles for a conglomerate that is in the bottom 
decile based on the HTSD measure. In column (2) of Table 7 we repeat the same analysis using 
LogHTSD and reach similar qualitative and quantitative conclusions.   
Results in Table 7 are in clear agreement with the theoretical deductions of Hirshleifer and Teoh 
(2003). Investors have more difficulty understanding earnings related information regarding 
                                                 
25 As in Table 6 we have a limited number of independent variables due to sample size restrictions. Including investor 
sophistication (IO), Loss, Amihud, # Analysts would have left us with too few observations to carry out the required 
analyses. 
 
26 The average for HTSD is 0.19 among conglomerates.  The 90th percentile value of HTSD is 0.336 while the 10th 
percentile value for HTSD is 0.013.  
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conglomerates with larger dispersion in their segment earnings growth rates. Our results indicate that 
market participants take longer to incorporate earnings related information into the prices of more 
complicated conglomerates in line with Hirshleifer and Teoh’s (2003) suggestion that innate business 
complexity introduces cognitive processing costs. These results also help establish the fact that the 
degree of complexity also matters in determining the magnitude of PEAD as there is cross-sectional 
variation in the magnitude of PEAD with respect to business complexity in a universe of firms 
composed solely of conglomerates. 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
5.1 Controlling for Potential Spillover from Industry-wide Information Events on PEAD  
The return predictability documented by Cohen and Lou (2012), though clearly different from 
our result, can potentially overlap with it in the following way: if the industries the conglomerate 
operates in are doing well in month t-1, the conglomerate is more likely to report good earnings in 
month t. If the earnings are particularly good, they will be followed by the post-announcement drift. 
However, part of this drift, at least in the first month (month t), can be explained by good returns to 
the pseudo-conglomerate in month t-1. Thus, the predictability documented by Cohen and Lou (2012) 
can potentially explain why PEAD is stronger for conglomerates.  
Our prior is that the overlap between our result and the Cohen and Lou result is not strong.  First, 
Cohen and Lou show that their predictability of conglomerate returns in month t using pseudo-
conglomerate returns in month t-1 is attributable primarily to the first two weeks of month t. Since an 
average earnings announcement happens in the middle of the month, it would be fair to say that we 
will be missing those two weeks most of the time. Second, the predictability in Cohen and Lou (2012) 
lasts for only one month, whereas the stronger PEAD for conglomerates lasts throughout the quarter.27  
In Table 8, we explicitly control for pseudo-conglomerate returns (PCRet) by adding it to our 
main regressions of CARs on SUE, complexity, the usual list of controls, the interaction of SUE and 
complexity as well as the interactions of SUE with the list of controls. Following Cohen and Lou, 
PCRet is computed by first taking an equal-weighted average return of all single-segment firms in 
each two-digit SIC industry, and then, for each conglomerate, value-weighting the industry returns 
                                                 
27 In unreported results we find that the larger drift experienced by more complicated firms is not confined to the first 
month of the quarter. 
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by the fractions of the segments with the same two-digit SIC code that comprise the total sales of the 
conglomerate.  
Since our sample has to include both single-segment firms and conglomerates in order to 
compare the PEADs for the two types of firms, we have to substitute an alternative variable for 
"PCRet" for single-segment firms. We define "PCRet" of single-segment firms as the lagged return 
to single segment firms in the same industry, thus turning it into a measure of industry momentum.28   
In the first column of Table 8, we regress CARs on SUE, PCRET itself as well as the interaction 
of PCRet with Conglo and our standard set of controls from Table 3. We control for both PCRet itself 
and the interaction of PCRet with the conglomerate dummy, to allow for different slopes on it for 
single-segment firms and conglomerates. In column (1) we observe that PCRet itself is insignificant, 
while its product with the conglomerate dummy is statistically significant. In the second column of 
Table 8, we add the interaction of SUE with Conglo to the list of controls which eliminates the 
statistical significance of the interaction between PCRET and Conglo. The other two columns of 
Table 8 add to the regression in the first column alternative measures of complexity, namely Comp 
in column (3) and NSeg in column (4), and their interactions with SUE. The slopes on the interaction 
of complexity with SUE estimate the additional PEAD experienced by conglomerates. The slopes 
estimated after controlling for the predictability documented in Cohen and Lou (2012) are similar in 
magnitude to the slopes estimated earlier in Table 3. We conclude that the stronger PEADs 
experienced by conglomerates is a separate phenomenon that has no overlap with the predictability 
of conglomerate returns using returns to pseudo-conglomerates as suggested by Cohen and Lou 
(2012). 
 
5.2 Controlling for Alternative Explanations of PEAD 
In Table 1, Panel C, and Table 2, Panel B1, we show that conglomerates face lower trading costs 
and lower limits to arbitrage compared to single-segment firms.  Hence, higher PEADs for more 
complicated firms cannot be explained by limits-to-arbitrage proxies used in Bartov, Radhakrishnan 
and Krinsky 2000; Mendenhall 2004; Ng, Rusticus, and Verdi 2008; Sadka 2006. 
                                                 
28 Strictly speaking, the correct way to estimate industry momentum would be to compute industry returns using all firms 
in the industry, including conglomerates. We tried that and found little change in the slope of "PCRet" for single-segment 
firms defined this way, which suggests that the average return to all single-segment firms in an industry is a good enough 
proxy for the true industry return. 
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In Table 9, we control for the potential impact of a large number of alternative explanations of 
the post-earnings announcement drift anomaly using Fama-Macbeth (1973) style regressions. In 
particular, we control for the impact of the time-varying nature of earnings persistence (Chen 2013), 
the impact of disclosure complexity (Miller 2010, You and Zhang 2009, Feldman, Govindaraj, 
Livnat, and Segal 2010, Lehavy, Li and Merkley 2011, Lee 2012), analyst responsiveness (Zhang 
2008) as well as the impact of ex-ante earnings volatility on earnings persistence (Cao and 
Narayanamoorthy 2012) on PEAD in an effort to distinguish the impact of innate business complexity 
on PEAD. 
  The first column in Table 9 estimates the relation between PEAD and conglomerate status 
controlling for the effect of Size, MB, conglomerate status and the interaction of SUE with Size and 
MB respectively. We use the results in column (1) of Table 9 as a benchmark for the other columns 
in Table 9.29   
In the second column of Table 9, we repeat the basic analysis conducted in column (1) for a 
subsample of firms for which we can calculate the time-varying earnings persistence variable (EP) 
proposed by Chen (2013).30 Results are qualitatively and quantitatively comparable to full-sample 
results. The third column estimates the relation between PEAD and conglomerate status controlling 
for time-varying earnings persistence (EP) and its interactions with SUE. We find that the interaction 
of SUE with EP has the predicted positive sign documented by Chen (2013). Controlling for the 
interaction of SUE with EP reduces the loading on the interaction term between SUE and the 
conglomerate dummy approximately by 20%. While this indicates that there could be some overlap 
between the effect of time-varying earnings persistence introduced by Chen (2013) and business 
complexity, this overlap is not large enough to negate the higher PEAD we observe in conglomerates. 
The fourth and fifth columns investigate the impact of innate business complexity on PEAD 
while controlling for the impact of disclosure complexity. Our proxy for disclosure complexity is the 
Gunning FOG index calculated as in Li (2008).31 In column (4), we investigate the impact of innate 
                                                 
29 In Table 9, we only use Size and MB as controls, as requiring non-missing variables of other controls from Table 3 
(such as analyst coverage and institutional ownership) would significantly reduce the number of conglomerates in some 
years in several columns of Table 9. 
 
30 Earnings Persistence (EP) is the firm-specific time-varying autocorrelation between two adjacent quarterly seasonally 
differenced earnings (SDE), where the autocorrelation is estimated in a two-step procedure using 14 persistence-related 
firm characteristics each quarter following Chen (2013). 
 
31 We got the data from Feng Li’s website, for which we are grateful. 
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business complexity on PEAD for the sub-set of firms for which we have textual complexity 
information. Column (4) reveals results consistent with our basic findings, as conglomerates have 
higher PEADs compared to single-segment firms with similar characteristics in this sub-sample as 
well. In column (5) we find a surprising result. The interaction of SUE with FOG, our proxy for 
disclosure complexity, is negative and statistically marginally insignificant suggesting that the post-
earnings announcement drift anomaly in fact could be smaller for firms with higher disclosure 
complexity. We believe this result could potentially indicate that the interaction of FOG with SUE is 
more likely to capture the impact of managerial obfuscation on PEAD, rather than the impact of firm 
complexity. Future research may attempt to decompose FOG into innate business-complexity and 
managerial obfuscation components as in Bushee et al. (2015) and analyze the impact of these 
components on PEAD separately. Controlling for FOG doesn’t affect our results as the interaction of 
SUE with Conglo in column (5) is statistically and economically significant and virtually 
indistinguishable from the results in column (4).         
In columns (6) and (7), we analyze whether varying analyst responsiveness for conglomerates 
and single-segment firms could explain our results. Following Zhang (2008), we construct a measure 
of analyst responsiveness (DRESP) and investigate whether its interaction with SUE could reduce 
the economic and statistical impact of business complexity on PEAD. Column (6) reveals that our 
basic results go through for the sub-sample of firms with available DRESP information. In column 
(7), we find that the interaction of SUE with DRESP is negative, qualitatively in line with Zhang 
(2008)’s prediction that more responsive analysts help investors react to earnings more timely and 
this leads to a reduction in PEAD.32 Controlling for the impact of analyst responsiveness does not 
change our basic result regarding the impact of innate business complexity on PEAD as the interaction 
of SUE with Conglo is once again statistically and economically significant and positive. 
In a recent paper, Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2012) show that, contrary to the expectations of 
the market, firms with higher ex-ante (lower) earnings volatility (trading frictions) have lower 
(higher) earnings surprise (SUE) persistence and this leads to lower PEAD. Since conglomerates, on 
average, have smaller earnings volatility (EarnVol) and fewer overall trading frictions it is imperative 
that we control for this effect. In column (8), we analyze the impact of organizational structure on 
                                                 
32 Unlike Zhang (2008), however, our interaction term is statistically insignificant.  We attribute this difference mainly to 
methodology.  When we use panel regressions, instead of Fama-MacBeth (1973) style regressions, the interaction term 
becomes significant.   
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PEAD for a subset of firms for which we have ex-ante earnings volatility, calculated as in Cao and 
Narayanamoorthy (2012). We find that our results are virtually the same as the full-sample results as 
conglomerates have larger PEADs for the same level of SUE compared to single-segment firms. In 
column (9) we explicitly control for the impact of ex-ante earnings volatility on PEAD. Our results 
are consistent with Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2012), since higher ex-ante earnings volatility leads 
to lower PEAD, as evidenced by the economically and statistically significant negative coefficient on 
the interaction of SUE and EarnVol. This, however, barely affects our main finding as the interaction 
of SUE with Conglo is 0.094 and statistically significant. This leads us to conclude that our result 
about the impact of innate business complexity is distinct from the impact of ex-ante earnings 
volatility on PEAD. 
Finally, in column (10) we control for the impact of MB, Size, Conglo, EP, FOG, DRESP and 
EarnVol along with their interactions with Conglo and find that the interaction of SUE with Conglo 
is statistically and economically significant, verifying the distinctiveness of the effect we have 
uncovered in this paper. 
 
5.3 Accounting for Non-Linearity in SUE and Using Alternative CAR Measures  
In our final robustness section we use an alternative measure of abnormal returns namely four-
factor Carhart alphas. In Table 10, we repeat our basic analysis from Table 3 using Carhart alphas on 
three alternative measures of unexpected earnings surprise along with three alternative measures of 
firm complexity (Conglo, Comp, NSeg) for a total of nine regressions. In particular, we run quarterly 
Fama-MacBeth regressions of firm-specific Carhart alphas cumulated in the 60 trading days (one-
quarter) following earnings announcements (αC(2;60)) on earnings surprise (SUE), interactions of 
SUE with the measures of firm complexity (Conglo, Comp and NSeg) and with standard controls 
(MB, Size, IO, Loss, Amihud and # Analysts) and their interactions with SUE.  
Columns (1) to (3) use the baseline definition of SUE, where we winsorize SUE at 99.5% and 
0.5% percentile levels every given quarter in order to account for the non-linear relation between 
SUE and future returns. In columns (4) to (6) we winsorize SUE at 95% and 5% percentile levels in 
a given quarter to account for both the non-linearity mentioned earlier as well to eliminate the 
possibility that extreme SUE values drive our results.  Finally, in columns (7) to (9) we transform 
SUE into decile ranks to verify that our main result in this paper leads to a profitable trading strategy.   
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In column (1) of Table 10, we find that the interaction of SUE with Conglo is virtually unchanged 
in our basic specification when we replace Size and BM adjusted returns with Carhart-alphas. 
Similarly, columns (2) and (3) reveal that interactions of SUE with Comp and NSeg, respectively, 
yield very similar results to those observed in Table 3, suggesting that whether we use Size and BM 
adjusted returns or Carhart alphas, we find larger PEADs for more complicated firms. 
Similarly, winsorizing SUE values at the 5th and 95th percentiles every quarter does not change 
our results. In columns (4) through (6) we find that the interaction of SUE with measures of innate 
business complexity are all positive and economically as well as statistically significant leading to 
higher PEADs. Results in columns (4) through (6) suggest that our results are not driven by extreme 
values of SUE. 
Finally, in columns (7) through (9) we repeat our basic Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions using 
Carhart alphas and decile values for SUE. Our conclusions are unchanged as these regressions also 
predict higher PEAD values for firms with more complicated underlying businesses. Results in 
columns (7) through (9) add further evidence to the tradability of this strategy as it utilizes decile 
portfolios. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we hypothesize and document that information about complex firms is harder to 
process, and predict therefore that PEAD is stronger for complex firms. Using organizational 
structure as our proxy for business complexity, we find that firms with more complicated 
organizational structures (conglomerates) have larger post-earnings announcement drifts (PEADs) 
compared to simpler firms (single-segment firms) with the same level of unexpected earnings surprise 
(SUE).  Specifically, we find that conglomerates have PEADs that are at least twice as large as single-
segment firms. The impact of complexity on PEAD lasts for at least two months, which leads us to 
conclude that investors of complex firms have even more trouble interpreting earnings-related 
information than they do interpreting industry-wide shocks (as Cohen and Lou, 2012, find, 
conglomerates incorporate industry-wide shocks with the delay of 2-4 weeks). We investigate 
whether the phenomenon documented in this paper is related to the return predictability documented 
in Cohen and Lou (2012). We control for pseudo-conglomerate returns in our regressions and find 
that the interaction between SUE and complexity is unaffected, which means that there is virtually 
no overlap between the Cohen and Lou (2012) result and the stronger PEAD for conglomerates. 
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Our findings cannot be explained by limits-to-arbitrage (studied in Bartov, Radhakrishnan and 
Krinsky 2000; Mendenhall 2004; Ng, Rusticus, and Verdi 2008; Sadka 2006) as conglomerates on 
average are larger than single-segment firms and have lower limits to arbitrage. We include 
interaction of PEAD with several limits-to-arbitrage variables as controls and our main results are 
still intact. Thus, we attribute our findings to the fact that it is more costly and difficult to understand 
firm-specific earnings information regarding complicated firms and that information processing takes 
more time for complex firms, leading conglomerates to underreact to earnings surprises significantly 
more than single-segment firms. In order to assess how innate business complexity impacts 
information production, we control for size by comparing conglomerates to single-segment firms of 
similar size. We document that, once we control for firm-size and other fundamental firm 
characteristics, conglomerates have relatively low institutional ownership and lower short interest, 
relatively low segment disclosure quality, are covered by fewer analysts, these analysts have less 
industry expertise and they also make larger forecast errors.   
Next, we investigate whether conglomerates release more news for the same level of unexpected 
earnings surprise (SUE) compared to single-segment firms. We find that the announcement reaction 
is very similar for single-segment firms and conglomerates, which, coupled with the stronger PEAD 
for conglomerates, implies that the total amount of information released at earnings announcements 
is larger for conglomerates. However, all this extra information seems to be absorbed in the post-
announcement window. We also find that conglomerates underreact to earnings surprises more than 
single-segment firms as evidenced by larger delayed response ratios for conglomerates (59.1%) 
compared to single-segment firms (44.5%). Our analysis lends further support to the interpretation 
that investors have more difficulty processing earnings related information regarding conglomerates 
and that information processing takes more time for complex firms.  
To address the concern that complexity is related to a certain unknown variable that also affects 
the strength of PEAD, we re-examine the effect of complexity on PEAD focusing on periods during 
which firm complexity increases. The analysis provides compelling evidence that supports our 
slower-information-processing hypothesis:  PEAD is stronger for new conglomerates than it is for 
existing conglomerates. We also find that investors are most confused about complicated firms that 
expand from within rather than firms that diversify into new business segments via mergers and 
acquisitions (and receive significant public scrutiny in the process). We further conduct an 
investigation of Hirshleifer and Teoh’s (2003) theoretical prediction that more complicated 
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conglomerates, measured as those with greater dispersion in the growth rates of their segment level 
earnings, face larger mispricing. We find that more complicated conglomerates have larger PEADs 
than less complicated conglomerates. Our analysis indicates that the degree of complexity influences 
the level of PEAD and that the cognitive cost of processing more complicated segment-level 
information leads to larger PEADs for more complicated conglomerates. 
Our results are robust to controlling for the impact of analyst responsiveness, ex-ante earnings 
volatility, time-varying earnings persistence and disclosure complexity on PEAD. Not only that, but 
we also document that our results go through when we use Carhart-alphas instead of size and book-
to-market adjusted returns and that our conclusions are robust to alternative definitions of SUE such 
as using SUE values winsorized at .5% (99.5%/0.5%), 5% (95%/5%) or simply using SUE deciles.   
We conclude that innate business complexity, proxied via organizational structure, has a profound 
effect on how investors process earnings related information.  Our analyses document that investors 
face larger cognitive processing costs regarding conglomerates which leads to larger post-earnings 
announcement drifts for firms with complicated underlying businesses.  
  
36 
 
 
References 
Amihud, Yakov, 2002, Illiquidity and Stock Returns: Cross-Section and Time-Series Effects, Journal 
of Financial Markets, v. 5, pp. 31-56 
 
Barinov, Alexander, 2018, Firm Complexity and Conglomerates Expected Returns, Working Paper, 
University of California Riverside 
 
Barinov, Alexander, and Julie Wu, 2014, High Short Interest Effect and Aggregate Volatility Risk, 
Journal of Financial Markets, v. 21, pp. 98-122 
 
Bartov, Eli, Suresh Radhakrishnan, and Itzhak Krinsky, 2000, Investor Sophistication and Patterns in 
Stock Returns after Earnings Announcements, The Accounting Review, v. 75, pp. 43-63 
 
Berger, Philip G. and Eli Ofek, 1995, Diversification's Effect on Firm Value, Journal of Financial 
Economics, v. 37, pp. 39-65 
 
Bushee, Brian, Ian Gow, and Daniel Taylor, 2015, Linguistic Complexity in Firm Disclosures: 
Obfuscation or Information? Working paper, University of Pennsylvania 
 
Cao, Sean and Ganapathi Narayanamoorthy, 2012, Earnings Volatility, Post–Earnings 
Announcement Drift, and Trading Frictions, Journal of Accounting Research, v. 50, pp. 41–74 
 
Chemmanur, Thomas, and Mark Liu, 2011, Institutional Trading, Information Production, and the 
Choice Between Spin-offs, Carve-outs, and Tracking Stock Issues, Journal of Corporate Finance, v. 
17, pp. 62-82 
 
Chen, Changling, 2013, Time-Varying Earnings Persistence and the Delayed Stock Return Reaction 
to Earnings Announcements, Contemporary Accounting Research, v. 30, pp. 549–578 
 
Chordia Tarun, Sahn-Wook Huh, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, 2007, The Cross-Section of 
Expected Trading Activity, Review of Financial Studies, v. 20, pp. 709-741 
 
Clement, Michael, 1999, Analyst forecast accuracy: Do Ability, Resources, and Portfolio Complexity 
Matter? Journal of Accounting and Economics, v. 27, pp. 285-303 
 
Cohen, Lauren, and Dong Lou, 2012, Complicated Firms, Journal of Financial Economics, v. 104, 
pp. 383-400 
 
Corwin, Shane A., and Paul Schultz, 2012, A Simple Way to Estimate Bid-Ask Spreads from Daily 
High and Low Prices, Journal of Finance, v. 67, pp. 719-759 
 
Daniel, Kent, Mark Grinblatt, Sheridan Titman, and Russ Wermers, 1997, Measuring Mutual Fund 
Performance with Characteristic-Based Benchmarks, Journal of Finance, v. 52, pp. 1035-1058 
 
DellaVigna, Stefano, and Joshua Pollet, 2009, Investor Inattention and Friday Earnings 
Announcements, Journal of Finance, v. 64, pp. 709-749 
37 
 
 
 
Duru, Augustine, and David M. Reeb, 2002, International Diversification and Analysts’ Forecast 
Accuracy and Bias, The Accounting Review, v. 77, pp. 415-433 
 
Fama, Eugene F., 1976, Foundations of Finance, Basic Books 
 
Fama, Eugene F., and James MacBeth, 1973, Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests, Journal 
of Political Economy, v. 81, pp. 607-636 
 
Feldman, Ronen, Suresh Govindaraj, Joshua Livnat, and Benjamin Segal, 2010, Management’s Tone 
Change, Post Earnings Announcement Drift and Accruals, Review of Accounting Studies, v. 15, pp. 
915-953 
 
Franco, Francesca, Oktay Urcan, and Florin Vasvari, 2015, Corporate Diversification and the Cost of 
Debt: The Role of Segment Disclosures, The Accounting Review In-Press 
 
Gilson, Stuart, Paul Healy, Christopher Noe, and Krishna Palepu, 2001, Analyst Specialization and 
Conglomerate Stock Breakups, Journal of Accounting Research, v. 39, pp. 565–582 
 
Gompers, Paul A., and Andrew Metrick, 2001, Institutional Investors and Equity Prices, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, v. 116, pp. 229-259 
 
Hasbrouck, Joel, 2009, Trading Costs and Returns for U.S. Equities: Estimating Effective Costs from 
Daily Data, Journal of Finance, v. 64, pp. 1445-1477 
 
Hilary, Gilles, and Rui Shen, 2013, The Role of Analysts in Intra-Industry Information Transfer, The 
Accounting Review, v. 88, pp. 1265-1287 
 
Hirshleifer, David and Siew Teoh, 2003, Limited attention, information disclosure, and financial 
reporting, Journal of Accounting and Economics, v. 36, pp. 337-386 
 
Hirshleifer, David, Seongyeon Sonya Lim, and Siew Teoh, 2009, Driven to Distraction: Extraneous 
Events and Underreaction to Earnings News, Journal of Finance, v. 64, pp. 2289-2325 
 
Hong, Harrison, Terence Lim, and Jeremy Stein, 2000, Bad News Travels Slowly: Size, Analyst 
Coverage, and the Profitability of Momentum Strategies, Journal of Finance, v. 55, pp. 265-295 
 
Lang, Larry and René Stulz, 1994, Tobin's q, Corporate Diversification and Firm Performance, 
Journal of Political Economy, v. 102, pp. 1248-1280 
 
Lee, Charles M.C. and Bhaskaran Swaminathan, 2000, Price Momentum and Trading Volume, 
Journal of Finance, v. 55, pp. 2017-2069 
 
Lee, Yen-Jung, 2012, The Effect of Quarterly Report Readability on Information Efficiency of Stock 
Prices, Contemporary Accounting Research, v. 29, pp. 1137–1170 
 
38 
 
 
Lehavy, Reuven, Feng Li, and Kenneth Merkley, 2011, The Effect of Annual Report Readability on 
Analyst Following and the Properties of Their Earnings Forecasts, The Accounting Review, v. 86, 
pp. 1087-1115 
 
Lesmond, David A., Joseph Ogden, and Charles Trzcinka, 1999, A New Estimate of Transaction 
Costs, Review of Financial Studies, v. 12, pp. 1113 1141 
 
Lesmond, David A., Michael J. Schill, and Chunsheng Zhou, 2004, The Illusory Nature of 
Momentum Profits, Journal of Financial Economics, v. 71, pp. 349-380 
 
Mendenhall, Richard, 2004, Arbitrage Risk and Post‐Earnings‐Announcement Drift, Journal of 
Business, v. 77, pp. 875-894 
 
Miller, Brian, 2010, The Effects of Reporting Complexity on Small and Large Investor Trading, The 
Accounting Review, v. 85, pp. 2107-2143 
 
Newey, Whitney, and Kenneth West, 1987, A Simple Positive Semi-De_nite Heteroskedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix, Econometrica, v.55, pp. 703-708 
 
Ng, Jeffery, Tjomme Rusticus, and Rodrigo Verdi, 2008, Implications of Transaction Costs for the 
Post–Earnings Announcement Drift, Journal of Accounting Research, v. 46, pp. 661–696 
 
Peterson, Mitchell A., 2009, Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing 
Approaches, Review of Financial Studies, v. 22, pp 435-480 
 
Roll, Richard, 1984, A Simple Implicit Measure of the Effective Bid-Ask Spread in an Efficient 
Market, Journal of Finance, v. 39, 1127-1139 
 
Sadka, Ronnie, 2006, Momentum and Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift Anomalies: The Role of 
Liquidity Risk, Journal of Financial Economics, v. 80, pp. 309-349 
 
Thomas, Shawn, 2002, Firm diversification and asymmetric information: evidence from analysts’ 
forecasts and earnings announcements, Journal of Financial Economics, v. 64, pp. 373-396 
 
You, Haifeng, and Xiao-jun Zhang, 2009, Financial Reporting Complexity and Investor Under-
reaction to 10-K Information, Review of Accounting Studies, v. 14, pp. 559-586 
 
Zhang, X. Frank, 2006, Information Uncertainty and Stock Returns, Journal of Finance, v. 61, pp. 
105-136 
 
Zhang, Yuan, 2008, Analyst Responsiveness and the Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, v.46, pp. 201-215 
39 
 
 
DATA APPENDIX 
 
The variables are arranged in alphabetical order according to the abbreviated variable name used in 
the tables. 
# Age  - Age measures firm age, as in Gompers and Metrick (2001), by counting the number 
of months since the first return appears in CRSP file. 
# An (number of analysts; analyst coverage) - the number of analysts covering the firm 
(from IBES detail file). 
Amihud (Amihud illiquidity measure) - the average ratio of absolute return to dollar 
volume, both from CRSP. The ratio is computed daily and averaged within each firm-year (firms 
with less than 200 valid return observations in a year and firms with stock price less than $5 at the 
end of the previous year are excluded). 
Beta – Beta is the systematic risk exposure to market-risk-premium in the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model and is calculated using the returns from the past 60 months. 
CAR(-1;1) (announcement return) - size and book-to-market adjusted cumulative daily 
returns between the day prior to the earnings announcement and the day after the earnings 
announcement. Earnings announcement dates are from COMPUSTAT, daily returns are from CRSP 
daily files, size and book-to-market adjustment is performed following Daniel et al. (1997). 
CAR(2;60) - size and book-to-market adjusted cumulative daily returns between the second 
day after the earnings announcement and the 60th day after the earnings announcement. 
CAR(2;20) (CAR(21;40), CAR(41;60)) - size and book-to-market adjusted cumulative daily 
returns between the second (21st, 41st) day after the earnings announcement and the 20th (40th, 60th) 
day after the earnings announcement. 
Complexity (firm complexity) - 1-HHI, where HHI is the Herfindahl index computed using 
segment sales, 𝐻𝐻𝐼 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 . N is the number of segments (from Compustat segment files, 
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segments with the same two-digits SIC code are counted as one segment), si is the fraction of total 
sales generated by segment i. 
Conglo (conglomerate dummy) - 1 if the firm is a conglomerate, 0 otherwise. The firm is a 
conglomerate if it has business segments in more than one two-digit SIC industry. 
Div (dividend payout ratio) – Dividend payout ratio is the ratio of dividends paid out to 
shareholders scaled by net income. 
Forecast dispersion – Forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of all earnings per share 
(EPS) forecasts, scaled by the absolute value of mean EPS forecasts. 
Forecast error - Forecast Error is the absolute value of the difference between consensus 
earnings forecast and actual earnings, scaled by actual earnings. 
GeoMulti (Geographic complexity) - GeoMulti, measuring geographic complexity, is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the firm generates its sales from a multitude of geographic segments 
and zero if the firm generates all of its sales from the same geographic segment. In calculating 
GeoMulti, we use Compustat segment files. 
Gibbs (Gibbs measure) - the slope from the regression ΔPt = a + cΔQt, where Pt is the stock 
price and Qt is the trade direction indicator. The values of the Gibbs measure are taken from the 
website of Joel Hasbrouck and are available from January 1964 to December 2009. For more details, 
please refer to Hasbrouck (2009). 
Intan (intangible asset ratio) - Intan is the log of one plus the ratio of intangible assets to 
total assets. 
IO (institutional ownership) - the sum of institutional holdings from Thompson Financial 
13F database, divided by the shares outstanding from CRSP. All stocks below the 20th NYSE/AMEX 
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size percentile are dropped. If the stock is not dropped, appears on CRSP, but not on Thompson 
Financial 13Fs, it is assumed to have zero institutional ownership. 
IVol (idiosyncratic volatility) - the standard deviation of residuals from the Fama-French 
model, fitted to the daily data for each firm-month (at least 15 valid observations are required). 
Lev (book leverage) - is the book leverage measured by total liabilities divided by total assets 
Loss - is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company incurred an operating loss in the 
immediate quarter, 0 otherwise. 
MB (market-to-book) – MB measures the ratio of market value of equity to book value of 
equity. Book value of equity reported any time within a given calendar year is calculated following 
Daniel and Titman (2006). If the fiscal year end falls between January and May, then the MB for, 
say, calendar year 2005 will be the market value of equity as of Dec 2004 scaled by the book equity 
reported for the fiscal year 2003. If the fiscal year end falls between June and December, then MB 
ratios for calendar year 2005 will be the market value of equity of as Dec 2004 divided by book equity 
in fiscal year 2004. 
Mlev (market leverage) – Market leverage is calculated as the ratio of the market value of 
debt scaled by the summation of market value of debt and market value of equity. We calculate the 
market value of debt using Merton’s (1974) structural model. 
Momentum - Momentum is the cumulative return between month -2 and month -12.  
Mom1 – Mom1 is the cumulative return in the past three months. 
Mom4 – Mom4 is the cumulative return between month -4 and month -12. 
NewConglo (new conglomerate dummy) - 1 if the firm became a conglomerate in the past 
two years (the year of the change in the conglomerate status excluded), zero otherwise. Single-
segment firms always have NewConglo=0. 
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NSeg (number of segments) - the number of business segments the firm has (from Compustat 
segment files). Segments with the same two-digit SIC code are counted as one segment. 
PCRet (pseudo-conglomerate return) - For each conglomerate firm, a pseudo-conglomerate 
consists of a portfolio of the conglomerate firm's segments made up using only stand-alone firms 
from the respective industries. For each portfolio that corresponds to a specific segment of the 
conglomerate firm an equal-weighted return is calculated. Returns corresponding to each segment are 
then value weighted according to that segment's contribution to the conglomerate firm's total revenues 
in order calculate a corresponding pseudo conglomerate return. 
Rdsales (Research and Development expenses to sales) - Rdsales is the ratio of R&D 
expense to sales. 
Res # An, Res # Spec (residual number of analyst/specialists) - the number of 
analysts/specialists following the firm orthogonalized to size. The orthogonalization is performed by 
running a cross-sectional regression of the number of analysts/specialists on size in each quarter and 
taking the residuals. 
Rett – Rett is the annual stock return of the current year. 
Rett-1 - Rett-1 measures the annual stock return of the previous year. 
Roll (Roll measure) - the estimate of effective bid-ask spread, computed as 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑡 = 200 ∙
√𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑡, 𝑅𝑡−1)) 
RSI (Relative short interest) - Relative short interest is equal to outstanding short position 
divided by the number of shares outstanding. 
Segment Disclosure Quality – Segment disclosure quality is the firm’s average industry-
adjusted (at 2-digit SIC code levels) percentage of segment items reported at the end of the fiscal year 
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and is calculated as described in Corporate Diversification and the Cost of Debt: The Role of Segment 
Disclosures by Franco, Urcan and Vasvari (2015). 
Size – Size is market capitalization. 
Snp (S&P 500 membership dummy) – Snp is equal to one if the firm is a member of the 
Standard and Poor’s 500 index, zero otherwise. 
# Spec (number of specialists) - the number of analysts covering the firm who are specialists 
in the firm's industry. An analyst is considered a specialist in the firm's industry if he/she covers at 
least five other firms with the same two-digit (# Spec2) or three-digit (# Spec3) SIC code in the same 
quarter. For a conglomerate, an analyst is classified as a specialist based on the industry affiliation of 
the largest segment. 
% Spec (percentage of specialists) - the number of specialists following the firm (# Spec) 
divided by the number of analysts following the firm (# An). 
SUE (earnings surprise) - standardized unexpected earnings, computed as 
𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑡 =  
𝐸𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−4
𝑃𝑡
 
where Et is the announced earnings per share for the current quarter, Et-4 is the earnings per 
share from the same quarter of the previous year, and Pt is the share price for the current quarter. 
Size (market cap) - shares outstanding times price, both from the CRSP monthly returns file. 
Size is measured in billion dollars. 
Spread - the spread implied by the daily high and low prices. Spread is calculated by the 
formula from Corwin and Schultz (2012): 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 =  
2∙(𝑒𝑥𝑝𝛼−1)
1+ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝛼
,     where 
α =  
√𝛽∙(√2−1)
3−2√2
− √
𝛾
3−2√2
,     where 
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𝛽 =  𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (
𝐻𝐼𝑡
𝐿𝑂𝑡
) +  𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (
𝐻𝐼𝑡+1
𝐿𝑂𝑡+1
)   𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝛾 =  𝑙𝑜𝑔2(
max (𝐻𝐼𝑡, 𝐻𝐼𝑡+1)
min (𝐿𝑂𝑡, 𝐿𝑂𝑡+1)
) 
where HIt (LOt) is the highest (lowest) price of the stock on day t. 
Turn (turnover) - monthly dollar trading volume over market capitalization at the end of the 
month (both from CRSP), averaged in each firm-year. 
Vol (volatility) – Vol is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the fiscal year. 
Zero (zero frequency) - the fraction of zero-return days within each firm-year. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Earnings Announcements       
Panel B1. Raw Values   Panel B2. Absolute Values 
  Single Conglo S-C     Single Conglo S-C 
SUE 0.156% 0.155% 0.001%   SUE 0.626% 0.660% -0.03% 
 (6.86) (4.03) (0.06)    (17.40) (17.20) (-1.52) 
EA 0.137% 0.161% -0.024%   EA 3.575% 2.866% 0.71% 
 (2.80) (3.17) (-0.59)    (12.50) (14.40) (5.67) 
# Observations 269,771 111,588     # Observations 269,771 111,588   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           
Panel A1. SUE and Innate Business Complexity Distribution - All Firms  
            Percentiles      
 # Observations Mean 1% 2.5% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 97.5% 99% 
SUE                   381,359 0.010 -0.317 -0.145 -0.075 -0.034 -0.007 0.002 0.008 0.029 0.064 0.129 0.302 
Nseg                  549,526 1.547 1 1 1 1 1 1.2 2 2.7 3.4 4 4.7 
Comp                549,526 0.117 0 0 0 0 0 0.023 0.143 0.449 0.546 0.608 0.678 
              
Panel A2. SUE and  Innate Business Complexity Distribution - Conglomerates Only 
        Percentiles      
  # Observations Mean 1% 2.5% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 97.5% 99% 
SUE                   111,588 -0.001 -0.271 -0.129 -0.067 -0.031 -0.007 0.002 0.008 0.026 0.053 0.101 0.220 
Nseg                  146,583 2.646 2 2 2 2 2 2.2 3.1 3.8 4.3 4.9 5.7 
Comp                146,583 0.351 0.011 0.021 0.041 0.079 0.191 0.368 0.497 0.596 0.655 0.694 0.736 
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Table 1- continued 
 
Panel C. Liquidity  
  Single Conglo S-C  
Gibbs 0.540 0.389 0.151  
 (13.30) (21.90) (4.61)  
# Observations 244,834 103,904    
Spread 0.871 0.599 0.272  
 (12.40) (13.00) (5.20)  
# Observations 313,595 120,893    
Roll 1.525 1.2 0.325  
 (17.80) (20.90) (4.95)  
# Observations 320,381 122,410    
Amihud 3.686 2.201 1.484  
 (3.73) (2.94) (4.76)  
# Observations 163,056 73,220    
Zero 14.09 11.81 2.28  
 (5.64) (5.87) (3.85)  
# Observations 319,289 121,481    
 
Note: This table presents mean (Panels A and B) and median (Panel C) values of numerous firm characteristics for single-segment firms (``Single"), and 
conglomerates (``Conglo") as well as the difference between single-segment firms and conglomerates (S-C). Conglomerates are defined as firms with 
business segments in more than one industry (industries are based on two-digit SIC codes) with corresponding information in Compustat Segment files, 
single-segment firms are all other firms with information in Compustat segment files. Innate business complexity, (Comp), is 1-HHI, where HHI is the 
Herfindahl index computed using segment sales within a conglomerate: for each segment, we compute the amount of sales generated by that segment as a 
fraction of the total sales of the firm and add up the squared fractions to compute HHI. (Nseg) is the number of segments the firm has and is an alternative 
measure of innate business complexity along with (Conglo) and (Comp). Segments are counted as distinct business units if they can be assigned to different 
two-digit SIC industries. (SUE) measures surprise unexpected earnings as (Et-Et-4)/Pt, where Et is the announced earnings per share for the current quarter, 
Et-4 is the earnings per share from the same quarter of the previous year, and Pt is the share price for the current quarter. (EA) measures earnings announcement 
reaction in percentage returns. Detailed explanations of SUE, Nseg, Comp, EA as well as firm level liquidity and information environment variables are in 
the Data Appendix. The differences for different firm characteristics between Single and Conglo firms are calculated quarterly and the time-series averages 
of these differences are reported in the difference columns. The t-statistics use Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and 
are reported below each coefficient in Italic font and in parentheses in Panels B and C. The sample period is from January 1977 to December 2010. The 
number of firm-quarters used in the analyses is abbreviated as # Observations. 
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Table 2 
Comparing the Information Production for Conglomerates and Single-segment firms with similar firm characteristics 
       
 
 
  
  
 
        
Panel A. Information Environment of Single-Segment firms and Conglomerates across size deciles 
Panel A1. Single-Segment Firms 
Size Small 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Big 
# Analysts 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.4 3.0 3.6 4.5 5.7 7.2 11.4 
# Specialists SIC2 0.8 1.0 1.4 1.8 2.3 2.9 3.7 4.8 6.3 10.4 
# Specialists SIC3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.3 4.3 5.7 9.7 
% of Specialists SIC2 0.604 0.657 0.682 0.702 0.725 0.754 0.771 0.805 0.837 0.896 
% of Specialists SIC3 0.472 0.533 0.564 0.576 0.606 0.633 0.662 0.696 0.736 0.820 
Forecast Dispersion 0.524 0.520 0.406 0.380 0.364 0.269 0.213 0.220 0.158 0.112 
Forecast Error 1.169 1.154 0.909 0.824 0.762 0.662 0.540 0.474 0.384 0.293 
Segment Disclosure Quality 0.366 0.365 0.361 0.359 0.358 0.358 0.349 0.341 0.335 0.339 
IO 0.172 0.207 0.240 0.280 0.329 0.374 0.426 0.462 0.486 0.501 
Turn 4.327 4.998 6.089 7.151 8.191 9.120 10.137 11.011 11.292 10.871 
RSI 0.005 0.010 0.016 0.022 0.029 0.035 0.039 0.038 0.035 0.025 
MB 2.587 2.765 2.885 2.995 3.141 3.266 3.390 3.592 3.773 4.554 
Loss 0.470 0.427 0.371 0.325 0.269 0.229 0.181 0.141 0.111 0.079 
Amihud 11.122 6.830 3.293 1.735 0.840 0.369 0.175 0.065 0.021 0.004 
# Observations 16,344 16,079 15,768 15,180 14,615 14,132 13,351 12,268 11,048 9,579 
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Table 2-continued 
 
Panel A2. Conglomerates 
Size Small 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Big 
# Analysts 1.1 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.4 4.3 6.0 10.1 
# Specialists SIC2 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.6 1.9 2.4 3.2 4.7 8.6 
# Specialists SIC3 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.7 4.0 7.6 
% of Specialists SIC2 0.508 0.482 0.542 0.561 0.580 0.628 0.637 0.696 0.740 0.819 
% of Specialists SIC3 0.367 0.377 0.402 0.420 0.415 0.463 0.498 0.570 0.608 0.711 
Forecast Dispersion 0.507 0.435 0.459 0.389 0.388 0.409 0.250 0.250 0.207 0.133 
Forecast Error 1.257 1.087 1.152 0.958 0.848 0.717 0.704 0.534 0.471 0.341 
Segment Disclosure Quality 0.200 0.198 0.196 0.197 0.195 0.196 0.199 0.203 0.203 0.203 
IO 0.170 0.206 0.234 0.277 0.340 0.394 0.438 0.455 0.475 0.495 
Turn 4.184 4.453 5.259 6.451 7.273 8.064 8.569 9.000 9.054 8.556 
RSI 0.005 0.008 0.015 0.022 0.028 0.031 0.032 0.031 0.025 0.018 
MB 1.981 2.157 2.106 2.373 2.234 2.242 2.195 2.415 2.616 3.221 
Loss 0.466 0.348 0.332 0.283 0.222 0.199 0.168 0.142 0.114 0.083 
Amihud 11.975 7.349 3.484 1.587 0.800 0.402 0.152 0.078 0.020 0.004 
# Observations 2,792 3,115 3,437 4,009 4,570 5,083 5,849 6,926 8,157 9,573 
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Table 2-continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Information Environment of Single-Segment firms and Conglomerates: The Role of Size Matching 
 
Panel B1. No Matching  Panel B2. Size Matching 
  Conglo Single diff t-stat    Conglo Single diff t-stat 
# Analysts 5.4 4.7 0.70 (5.28)  # Analysts 5.4 6.6 -1.20 (-7.53) 
# Specialists (SIC2) 4.3 4.0 0.30 (2.41)  # Specialists (SIC2) 4.3 5.8 -1.50 (-10.01) 
# Specialists (SIC3) 3.6 3.6 0.10 (0.74)  # Specialists (SIC3) 3.6 5.2 -1.60 (-11.06) 
% of Specialists (SIC2) 0.70 0.77 -0.07 (-12.63)  % of Specialists (SIC2) 0.70 0.81 -0.12 (-12.42) 
% of Specialists (SIC3) 0.57 0.66 -0.09 (-14.45)  % of Specialists (SIC3) 0.57 0.71 -0.15 (-14.46) 
Forecast Dispersion 0.24 0.25 -0.01 (-1.10)  Forecast Dispersion 0.24 0.18 0.06 (3.24) 
Forecast Error 0.59 0.63 -0.04 (-1.88)  Forecast Error 0.59 0.50 0.09 (3.29) 
Segment Disclosure Quality 0.20 0.35 -0.15 (-3.60)  Segment Disclosure Quality 0.20 0.35 -0.15 (-3.54) 
IO 0.41 0.37 0.04 (12.65)  IO 0.41 0.41 0.00 (0.40) 
Turn 7.44 8.04 -0.60 (-2.29)  Turn 7.44 8.87 -1.43 (-3.99) 
RSI 0.02 0.02 -0.00 (-6.14)  RSI 0.02 0.03 -0.00 (-9.02) 
MB 2.17 2.85 -0.67 (-6.21)  MB 2.17 3.07 -0.89 (-6.12) 
Loss 0.18 0.24 -0.06 (-4.08)  Loss 0.18 0.19 -0.01 (-1.09) 
Amihud 1.29 1.83 -0.54 (-3.25)  Amihud 1.29 1.18 0.11 (2.17) 
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Table 2-continued 
 
 
Panel C. Impact of Innate Business Complexity on the Information Environment 
              
log(1 + # Analysts)  Forecast Error  IO  Turn  RSI 
  1    2    3    4    5 
Intercept 0.176  Intercept 33.777  Intercept 8.349  Intercept -3.947  Intercept 1.147 
 (3.46)   (2.78)   (3.81)   (-6.78)   (5.13) 
Conglo -0.073  Conglo 11.406  Conglo -3.817  Conglo -2.074  Conglo -0.381 
 (-4.73)   (2.28)   (-4.47)   (-7.45)   (-3.04) 
GeoMulti 0.052  GeoMulti 4.671  GeoMulti 11.407  GeoMulti 2.719  GeoMulti 0.233 
 (4.15)   (1.12)   (15.40)   (11.45)   (1.98) 
Size 0.026  Size -0.912  Size 0.021  Size 0.053  Size -0.036 
 (50.51)   (-9.40)   (0.72)   (5.10)   (-7.41) 
MB -0.000  Rdsales 0.258  Div 0.204  MB 0.043  MB 0.026 
 (-0.56)   (2.16)   (8.76)   (10.21)   (10.92) 
Beta 0.000  Lev 0.383  Age -0.054  Beta 0.037  Beta 0.021 
 (0.27)   (5.02)   (-3.77)   (26.95)   (10.71) 
Nasdaq 0.093  Intan -0.050  Mom1 0.017  Age 0.005  IO 0.034 
 (6.09)   (-0.63)   (5.75)   (1.27)   (12.38) 
1/P 0.001  Vol 0.698  Mom4 -0.021  Mlev 0.007  Rett-1 -0.000 
 (3.65)   (7.12)   (-3.95)   (1.76)   (-1.83) 
Vol -0.001     Prc 0.323  # Analysts 0.076  Mom -0.009 
 (-4.64)      (14.55)   (9.70)   (-8.24) 
Ret -0.005     Snp 0.042  Prc -0.021  Prc 0.009 
 (-37.76)      (0.03)   (-2.55)   (2.24) 
Rett-1 -0.003        Retn -0.024    
 (-29.22)         (-28.76)    
Turn 0.006        Retp 0.049    
 (20.42)              (25.94)       
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Note: Panel A of this table compares the information environment of single-segment firms and conglomerates in ten size decile groups where the same size 
break-points are used for both single-segment firms and conglomerates. (Conglo) refers to conglomerates, while (Single) refers to single-segment firms. Panel 
A.1 reports statistics for a range of information quality measures as well as a set of control variables for single-segment firms while Panel A.2 reports these 
statistics for conglomerates. (# Analysts) measures the total number of analysts covering a firm. # Specialists SIC2 (# Specialists SIC3) reports the number of 
analysts that cover five or more firms in the same industry where industry is defined using the two-digit (three-digit) SIC code. For conglomerates, specialists 
are defined based on the industry affiliation of the firm's main segment. % of Specialists SIC2 (% of Specialists SIC3) reports the percentage of analysts that 
cover the firm who are specialists using the two-digit (three-digit) SIC code. (Forecast Dispersion) is the standard deviation of all earnings per share (EPS) 
forecasts, scaled by the absolute value of mean EPS forecasts. (Forecast Error) is the absolute value of the difference between consensus earnings forecast 
and actual earnings, scaled by actual earnings. (Segment Disclosure Quality) is the firm’s average industry-adjusted (at 2-digit SIC code levels) percentage of 
segment items reported at the end of the fiscal year and is calculated as described in Corporate Diversification and the Cost of Debt: The Role of Segment 
Disclosures by Franco, Urcan and Vasvari (2015). (IO) is the percent of institutional ownership. (Turn) measures turnover as traded dollar volume scaled by 
market capitalization. (RSI) is relative short interest measured by outstanding short position divided by the number of shares outstanding. (MB) is the market-
to-book ratio. (Loss) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company incurred an operating loss in the immediate quarter. (Amihud) is Amihud’s (2002) 
transaction costs measure. The number of firm-quarters used in the analyses is abbreviated as (# Observations). Panel B summarizes the same statistics for 
single-segment firms and conglomerates while also reporting the differences for the two groups. Panel B.2 reports differences between conglomerates (Conglo) 
and size-matched single segment firms (Single), while Panel B.1 reports differences without any size-matching. We report the differences between the two 
groups using diff, while t-statistics are reported below in Italic font and in parentheses. The sample excludes firms with market caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX 
size quintile.  Panel C extends the analyses in Panels A and B in a regression setting where we control for firm characteristics other than size deemed important 
by the extant literature in the determination of analyst coverage, analyst forecast errors, institutional ownership, relative short interest as well as turnover. 
Geographic complexity, (GeoMulti), is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm generates its sales from a multitude of geographic segments and zero if the 
firm generates all of its sales from the same geographic segment. (Size) is the logarithm of market capitalization. (MB) is the market-to-book ratio. (Beta) is 
the CAPM market beta in the past 60 months. (Nasdaq) is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm trades on the Nasdaq stock exchange and zero otherwise. 
(1/P) is one divided by the year-end stock price. (Vol) is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the fiscal year. (Ret) is the annual stock return of 
the current year, and (Rett-1) measures the annual stock return of the previous year. (Rdsales) is the ratio of R&D expense to sales. (Lev) is the book leverage 
measured by total liabilities divided by total assets. (Intan) is the log of one plus the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. (Div) is the dividend payout ratio. 
(Age) is the firm age. (Mom1) is the cumulative return in the past three months, and (Mom4) is the cumulative return between month -4 and month -12. (Prc) 
is the stock price. (Snp) is the membership in the S&P500 index dummy variable. (Mlev) is the market leverage. Retp (Retn) is the positive (negative) return 
in the previous quarter which equals to the return if it is positive (negative), zero otherwise. (Mom) is the cumulative return between month -2 and month -12. 
The sample period is from January 1984 to December 2010 as we are not able to calculate analyst forecast errors prior to January 1984 due to data limitations.
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Table 3 
        Impact of Innate Business Complexity on the Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SUE 0.102  0.068  0.353  0.077  0.351  0.005  0.297  
  (3.46) (2.31) (3.81) (2.67) (3.74) (0.13) (3.08) 
SUE*Conglo   0.141  0.129          
    (2.73) (2.33)         
SUE*Comp       0.313  0.344      
        (2.79) (2.58)     
SUE*Nseg           0.069  0.066  
            (2.50) (2.11) 
SUE*MB    -0.411    -0.469    -0.512  
      (-1.05)   (-1.13)   (-1.23) 
SUE*Size     0.053    0.038    0.049  
      (0.70)   (0.45)   (0.60) 
SUE*IO     0.000    0.001    0.003  
      (0.00)   (0.06)   (0.13) 
SUE*Loss     -0.160    -0.161    -0.169  
      (-2.95)   (-2.95)   (-3.14) 
SUE*Amihud     0.796    0.815    0.824  
      (2.79)   (2.89)   (2.88) 
SUE*# Analysts     -0.059    -0.048    -0.054  
      (-1.77)   (-1.33)   (-1.50) 
Conglo   -0.001  -0.001          
    (-0.31) (-0.32)         
Comp       -0.003  -0.001      
        (-0.62) (-0.34)     
Nseg           -0.001  0.000  
            (-0.47) (-0.42) 
MB     0.018    0.019    0.018  
      (1.49)   (1.48)   (1.49) 
Size     0.001    0.001    0.001  
      (0.53)   (0.54)   (0.62) 
IO     0.002    0.002    0.002  
      (1.77)   (1.69)   (1.71) 
Loss     -0.011    -0.011    -0.011  
      (-2.40)   (-2.46)   (-2.46) 
Amihud     0.034    0.035    0.034  
      (1.64)   (1.60)   (1.62) 
# Analysts     0.004    0.004    0.004  
      (2.44)   (2.44)   (2.45) 
# Observations 113,470  113,470  113,470  113,470  113,470  113,470  113,470  
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Note: This table presents the results for quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of size and book-to-market adjusted 
cumulative returns in the 60 trading days (one-quarter) following earnings announcements (CAR(2;60)) on 
earnings surprise, SUE, and its interaction with alternative measures of innate business complexity as well as a 
set of control variables that impact the magnitude of the post earnings announcement drift (PEAD). (SUE) 
measures surprise unexpected earnings as (Et-Et-4)/Pt, where Et is the announced earnings per share for the current 
quarter, Et-4 is the earnings per share from the same quarter of the previous year, and Pt is the share price for the 
current quarter. (Conglo) is the conglomerate dummy, equal to 1 if the firm is a conglomerate and 0 otherwise. 
Conglomerates are defined as firms with more than one business segment. Business complexity, (Comp), is 1-
HHI, where HHI is the Herfindahl index computed using segment sales within a conglomerate: for each segment, 
we compute the amount of sales generated by that segment as a fraction of the total sales of the firm and add up 
the squared fractions to compute HHI. (Nseg) is the number of segments the firm has. Segments are counted as 
distinct business units if they can be assigned to different two-digit SIC industries. (MB) is the market-to-book 
ratio. Size (Size) is the log of market capitalization. (IO) is the percent of institutional ownership. (Loss) is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the company incurred an operating loss in the immediate quarter. (Amihud) is 
Amihud’s (2002) transaction costs measure. (# Analysts) is the number of the analysts covering the firm. The t-
statistics use Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and are reported below 
each coefficient in Italic font and in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1977 to December 2010. 
The sample excludes firms with market caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX size quintile. The number of firm-
quarters used in the analyses is abbreviated as # Observations.  
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Table 4 
Joint impact of innate business complexity and investor sophistication on PEAD 
         
Joint Impact of Innate Business Complexity and Institutional Ownership on PEAD 
Institutional Ownership Quintiles  Low Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 High 
SUE 0.305 0.215 0.288 0.201 0.299 
 (3.18) (1.66) (2.69) (2.51) (2.07) 
SUE*Conglo 0.264 0.317 0.182 0.087 -0.031 
 (2.11) (1.97) (1.25) (0.68) (-0.14) 
SUE*MB -0.223 -0.017 0.184 -0.239 -0.011 
 (-0.82) (-0.09) (0.85) (-1.14) (-0.04) 
SUE*Size 0.014 0.038 0.160 0.402 0.101 
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.69) (2.62) (0.54) 
SUE*Loss -0.288 -0.277 -0.344 0.069 -7.566 
 (-2.78) (-1.95) (-2.39) (0.32) (-1.06) 
SUE*Amihud 0.389 0.245 0.179 -0.013 0.384 
 (2.25) (2.02) (1.35) (-0.09) (2.16) 
SUE*# Analysts -0.115 -0.072 0.004 -0.131 -0.212 
 (-1.50) (-0.57) (0.04) (-1.35) (-1.56) 
Conglo -0.002 -0.008  -0.000  0.002  0.004 
 (-0.52) (-2.33) (-0.04) (0.82) (1.37) 
MB 0.002 0.004 0.012 0.002 0.001 
 (0.20) (1.90) (2.49) (1.21) (0.76) 
Size -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.002 
 (-0.08) (0.25) (-0.04) (-0.42) (0.99) 
Loss -0.004 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009  0.092 
 (-0.73) (-1.56) (-1.49) (-1.69) (0.81) 
Amihud  0.008  0.002  0.001  0.001 - 0.003 
 (1.16) (1.17) (0.90) (0.30) (-1.26) 
# Analysts 0.003 0.003  0.005  0.007  0.003 
 (1.68) (1.66) (3.10) (3.69) (1.29) 
# Observations 23,947 21,421 22,717 22,479 22,904 
 
Note: This table presents the results for quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of size and book-to-market adjusted cumulative returns in the 
60 trading days (one-quarter) following earnings announcements (CAR(2;60)) on earnings surprise, SUE, and its interaction with innate 
business complexity, measured using the Conglo dummy, in five distinct cross-sections sorted based on the percentage owned by institutions 
(IO). Conglo is the conglomerate dummy, equal to 1 if the firm is a conglomerate and 0 otherwise. Conglomerates are defined as firms with 
operations in at least two distinct industries based on the SIC-2 descriptions of industry. Every quarter, firms are classified into five distinct 
institutional ownership groups. In column (1) we use firm-quarters with the lowest institutional ownership, in column (2) we conduct our 
analyses for firm-quarters where the institutional ownership is in the 2nd lowest quintile, in column (3) we limit our analyses to firm-quarters 
where the institutional ownership is in the median quintile, in column (4) we use firm-quarters in the 2nd highest institutional ownership 
quintile and in column (5) we use firm-quarters that are in the highest institutional ownership quintile. The analyses in the table also control 
for the interaction of SUE with market-to-book (MB), size measured as the logarithm of market capitalization (Size), a quarterly loss dummy 
that takes on the value of one when the firm incurs losses (Loss), a measure of transaction costs (Amihud) and the number of analysts (# 
Analysts), as well as (Conglo), (MB), (Size), (Loss), (Amihud) and (# Analysts) themselves. Detailed definitions of size (Size), market-to-
book ratio (MB), the (Loss) dummy, Amihud measure (Amihud) and (# Analysts) are in the Data Appendix. The t-statistics use Newey-West 
(1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and are reported below each coefficient in Italic font and in parentheses. The 
sample period is from January 1978 to December 2011. The one-year lag in the sample is necessary in order to calculate segment and firm 
growth rates. The sample excludes firms with market caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX size quintile. The number of firm-quarters used in 
the analyses is abbreviated as # Observations. 
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Table 5 
Delayed Response Reaction for Single-segment Firms versus Conglomerates 
 
 
Panel A. PEAD in Extreme Deciles       
  CAR(-1;1) CAR(2;60)  
SUETop 0.028  0.022   
  (12.22) (3.67)  
SUETop*Conglo -0.002  0.015   
  (-0.66) (2.12)  
SUETop*MB -0.001  -0.003   
  (-0.91) (-1.10)  
SUETop*Size -0.004  -0.001   
  (-1.49) (-0.15)  
SUETop*IO 0.001  -0.006   
  (0.42) (-1.84)  
SUETop*Loss -0.005  -0.018   
  (-1.79) (-2.55)  
SUETop*Amihud 0.008  0.033   
  (1.47) (2.44)  
SUETop*# Analysts -0.003  -0.010   
  (-2.22) (-2.64)  
Conglo 0.000  -0.011   
  (0.10) (-2.10)  
MB 0.001  -0.003   
  (1.31) (-1.35)  
Size 0.002  0.001   
  (1.32) (0.15)  
IO 0.002  0.005   
  (1.89) (2.17)  
Loss -0.002  0.005   
  (-1.40) (1.13)  
Amihud -0.002  -0.003   
  (-0.46) (-0.35)  
# Analysts 0.002  0.010   
  (2.02) (4.02)  
# Observations 18,484  18,484   
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Panel B. Delayed Response Ratio    
   Single Conglo Diff 
Delayed Response Ratio 0.445 0.591 0.146 
 (6.36) (10.87) (2.17) 
# Observations 18,484 18,484  
 
Note: Panel A of this table presents the results for quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of size and book-to-market 
adjusted cumulative returns in the three days around earnings announcements, CAR(-1;+1) and in the post-
announcement window, CAR(+2;+60), on the top decile dummy (SUETop) and on its interaction with the 
conglomerate dummy (Conglo) as well as with market-to-book (MB), size (Size), institutional ownership (IO), 
quarterly loss dummy that takes on a value of one when the firm incurs losses (Loss), a measure of transaction costs 
(Amihud) and the number of analysts (# Analysts), as well as (Conglo), (MB), (Size), (Loss), (Amihud) and (# 
Analysts) themselves. SUETop is 1 for the top SUE decile and 0 for the bottom SUE decile and helps capture hedge 
returns to going long on the highest SUE decile and going short on the lowest SUE decile (all other firms are dropped 
from the sample). The t-statistics use Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and 
are reported below each coefficient in Italic font and in parentheses. Panel B uses the results in Panel A to estimate 
what fraction of information in earnings announcement is incorporated into the prices outside of the earnings 
announcement window. Specifically we calculate the ratio of the drift return, CAR(+2,+60), to the total earnings 
reaction return, CAR(-1,+60), to measure the delayed response ratio for single-segment firms and conglomerates, 
respectively, and calculate the difference in the delayed response for these two groups of firms for extreme positive 
(negative) surprise earnings deciles. Conglo is the conglomerate dummy, equal to 1 if the firm is a conglomerate 
and 0 otherwise. Conglomerates are defined as firms with more than one business segment. The z-statistics are 
reported below each coefficient in Italic font and in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1977 to 
December 2010. The sample excludes firms with market caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX size quintile. The number 
of firm-quarters used in the analyses is abbreviated as # Observations.  
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Table 6 
Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift and Changes in Firm Complexity 
          
PEAD and New Conglomerates  
     
  1 2 3  
SUE 0.069 0.069 0.069  
 (3.46) (3.46) (3.46)  
SUE*Conglo 0.103 0.116 0.091  
 (2.83) (3.20) (2.71)  
SUE*NewConglo 0.145    
 (1.90)    
SUE*M&A  0.055   
  (0.48)   
SUE*NoM&A   0.605  
     (1.83)  
SUE*MB 0.086 0.121 0.087  
 (0.48) (0.64) (0.48)  
SUE*Size -0.022 -0.024 -0.021  
 (-0.89) (-0.97) (-0.86)  
Size 0.002 0.002 0.002  
 (2.35) (2.38) (2.34)  
MB 0.004 0.005 0.005  
 (0.57) (0.57) (0.58)  
Conglo -0.003 -0.004 -0.003  
 (-1.50) (-1.62) (-1.53)  
NewConglo -0.004 -0.002 -0.005  
 (-1.62) (-0.65) (-1.36)  
# Observations 236,976 236,976 236,976  
 
Note: This table presents the results for quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of size and book-to-market adjusted cumulative 
returns in the 60 trading days (one-quarter) following earnings announcements (CAR(2;60)) on earnings surprise (SUE), 
interaction of SUE with alternative measures of firm complexity (Conglo and NSeg), as well as the interaction of SUE with a 
dummy variable for newly created conglomerates (NewConglo). We also control for market-to-book (MB), firm size (Size), 
and their interactions in all the regressions. NewConglo dummy is equal to one for two years after a firm reports an increase in 
the number of segments and zero otherwise. NewConglo is set to zero for all single-segment firms. SUE*M&A 
(SUE*NoM&A) is the interaction of SUE with NewConglo for segment increases that can be attributed to diversifying M&A 
activity (that cannot be attributed to diversifying M&A activity). Detailed descriptions of all firm characteristics are in the Data 
Appendix. The t-statistics use Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and are reported below 
each coefficient in Italic font and in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1977 to December 2010.  The sample 
excludes firms with market caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX size quintile. The number of firm-quarters used in the analyses is 
abbreviated as # Observations. We control for BM and Size in all regressions as well as M&A and NoM&A dummies wherever 
it is relevant, but for brevity we do not report the coefficients on these firm characteristics. 
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Table 7 
Impact of Dispersion in Segment Growth Rates (HTSD) on Post Earnings Announcement Drift  
      
PEAD in the Conglomerates Only Sample 
  1 2 
SUE 0.148 0.142 
 (2.78) (2.55) 
SUE*HTSD 0.154  
 (1.77)  
SUE*LogHTSD  0.251 
  (2.09) 
SUE*MB 0.243 0.237 
 (0.83) (0.81) 
SUE*Size 0.001 -0.007 
 (0.02) (-0.10) 
MB -0.004 -0.004 
 (-1.04) (-1.02) 
Size 0.004 0.004 
 (2.79) (2.77) 
HTSD -0.004  
 (-2.00)  
LogHTSD  -0.009 
  (-2.21) 
# Observations 64,405 64,405 
 
 
Note: This table presents the results for quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of size and book-to-market adjusted cumulative 
returns in the 60 trading days (one-quarter) following earnings announcements (CAR(2;60)) on earnings surprise, SUE, and 
its interaction with (HTSD), a theoretical construct proposed by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), which captures the level of 
dispersion in segment growth rates with respect to the aggregate growth rate of the firm. (HTSD) is the Hirshleifer and Teoh 
(2003) Segment-growth Dispersion measure computed using segment sales and growth rates within a conglomerate: for each 
segment, we compute the deviation of its growth rate from the firm’s aggregate growth rate and square it, we then value-
weight all segment deviation squared values by the amount of sales generated by that segment as a fraction of the total sales 
of the firm and add up all the squared segment deviation values weighed by corresponding sales-share values to calculate 
HTSD.  LogHTSD is the natural logarithm of one plus HTSD.  Segments are counted as distinct business units if they can 
be assigned to different two-digit SIC industries. Detailed descriptions of market-to-book ratio (MB) and size (Size) are in 
the Data Appendix. The t-statistics use Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and are 
reported below each coefficient in Italic font and in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1978 to December 2011. 
The one-year lag in the sample is necessary in order to calculate segment and firm growth rates. The sample excludes firms 
with market caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX size quintile. The number of firm-quarters used in the analyses is abbreviated 
as # Observations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
59 
 
Table 8 
Robustness: Controlling for Potential Spillover from Industry-wide Information Events on PEAD 
 
          
Complexity Measure Conglo Conglo Comp Nseg 
  1 2 3 4 
SUE 0.375 0.350 0.347 0.286 
 (4.03) (3.90) (3.80) (3.09) 
SUE*Complexity  0.136 0.357 0.072 
  (2.45) (2.70) (2.25) 
PCRet* Complexity  0.046 0.029 0.040 0.044 
 (2.19) (1.29) (1.85) (1.97) 
SUE*MB -0.542 -0.396 -0.455 -0.496 
 (-1.31) (-1.02) (-1.11) (-1.20) 
SUE*Size 0.070 0.049 0.034 0.043 
 (0.83) (0.63) (0.39) (0.52) 
SUE*IO 0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.003 
 (0.07) (-0.02) (0.04) (0.12) 
SUE*Loss -0.154 -0.160 -0.160 -0.168 
 (-2.77) (-2.96) (-2.97) (-3.17) 
SUE*Amihud 0.784 0.795 0.810 0.820 
 (2.71) (2.89) (2.96) (2.97) 
SUE*# Analysts -0.049 -0.059 -0.048 -0.055 
 (-1.47) (-1.77) (-1.34) (-1.51) 
Complexity  -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
  (-0.29) (-0.49) (-0.53) 
PCRet -0.008 -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 
 (-0.37) (-0.17) (-0.31) (-0.32) 
MB 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.017 
 (1.53) (1.57) (1.55) (1.55) 
Size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.54) (0.60) (0.62) (0.70) 
IO 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.81) (1.85) (1.79) (1.80) 
Loss -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
 (-2.63) (-2.63) (-2.70) (-2.69) 
Amihud 0.035 0.034 0.036 0.035 
 (1.60) (1.63) (1.60) (1.62) 
# Analysts 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (2.35) (2.40) (2.39) (2.40) 
# Observations 112,520 112,520 112,520 112,520 
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Note: This table presents the results for quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of size and book-to-market adjusted 
cumulative returns in the 60 trading days (one-quarter) following earnings announcements (CAR(2;60)) on earnings 
surprise (SUE), interaction of SUE with Conglo (Comp / Nseg), interaction of (SUE) with the recurring control variables, 
as well as Conglo (Comp / Nseg) and the usual control variables themselves. Furthermore, we also control for the impact 
of industry-wide information events, estimated via pseudo-conglomerate returns (PCRet), in all columns. PCRet is 
calculated one month before the earnings announcement. To compute PCRet, we first compute equal-weighted returns to 
all single-segment firms in an industry (industries are defined based on the two-digit SIC codes). For a single-segment 
firm, PCRet is calculated as the return to other single-segment firms in its two-digit SIC industry. For conglomerates, 
industry returns for affiliated segments are weighed by the respective sales-shares of the business segments and the 
weighted average is referred to as PCRet. Innate business complexity variables are described in the description of Table 2 
and in the Data Appendix. Recurring control variables include market-to-book (MB), size (Size), institutional ownership 
(IO), a quarterly loss dummy that takes on a value of one when the firm incurs losses (Loss), a measure of transaction costs 
(Amihud) and the number of analysts (# Analysts). (Conglo) is the conglomerate dummy, equal to 1 if the firm is a 
conglomerate and 0 otherwise. Conglomerates are defined as firms with more than one business segment. Innate business 
complexity, (Comp), is 1-HHI, where HHI is the Herfindahl index computed using segment sales within a conglomerate: 
for each segment, we compute the amount of sales generated by that segment as a fraction of the total sales of the firm and 
add up the squared fractions to compute HHI. (Nseg) is the number of distinct business segments that the firm operates in. 
The t-statistics use Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and are reported below each 
coefficient in Italic font and in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1977 to December 2010. The sample 
excludes firms with market caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX quintile. The number of firm-quarters used in the analyses is 
abbreviated as # Observations. We control for Size and BM in all regressions as well as Conglo, Comp and Nseg wherever 
it is relevant but for brevity we do not report the coefficients on these firm characteristics. 
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Table 9 
Robustness: Controlling for Alternative Explanations of PEAD 
                      
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
SUE 0.086  0.087  0.098  0.056  0.063  0.056  0.190  0.094  0.118  0.193  
 (3.65)  (3.37)  (3.84)  (1.79)  (1.99)  (1.08)  (1.78)  (3.43)  (3.68)  (1.33)  
SUE*MB 0.080  -0.086  -0.077  0.000  0.009  -0.085  -0.166  -0.038  -0.023  -0.408  
 (0.46)  (-0.22)  (-0.20)  (0.00)  (0.10)  (-0.67)  (-1.15)  (-0.14)  (-0.07)  (-1.97)  
SUE*Size -0.020  -0.022  -0.026  -0.015  -0.011  -0.082  -0.089  -0.012  -0.005  0.053  
 (-0.80)  (-0.71)  (-0.84)  (-0.34)  (-0.27)  (-1.55)  (-1.73)  (-0.50)  (-0.19)  (0.87)  
SUE*Conglo 0.102  0.073  0.079  0.095  0.091  0.193  0.189  0.103  0.094  0.248  
 (3.11)  (2.17)  (2.39)  (1.82)  (1.84)  (2.44)  (2.28)  (3.10)  (2.74)  (2.70)  
SUE*EP   0.031        0.034  
   (2.57)        (0.95)  
SUE*FOG     -0.039      -0.053  
     (-1.57)      (-1.23)  
SUE*DRESP       -0.283    -0.256  
       (-1.10)    (-1.94)  
SUE*EarnVol         -0.027  -0.025  
                 (-1.95)  (-0.60)  
MB -0.001  0.002  0.002  0.004  0.003  0.001  0.001  -0.001  -0.002  0.008  
 (-0.17)  (0.18)  (0.16)  (0.78)  (0.68)  (0.27)  (0.31)  (-0.16)  (-0.29)  (2.67)  
Size 0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003  
 (2.37)  (2.19)  (2.19)  (2.01)  (2.02)  (2.61)  (2.28)  (2.33)  (2.43)  (1.40)  
Conglo -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.004  -0.004  0.002  0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.002  
 (-1.14)  (-1.16)  (-1.16)  (-1.22)  (-1.22)  (0.91)  (1.10)  (-1.38)  (-1.29)  (-0.71)  
EP   0.000        -0.001  
   (-0.48)        (-1.28)  
FOG     0.001      0.002  
     (1.21)      (1.64)  
DRESP       0.010    0.013  
       (2.67)    (2.20)  
EarnVol         -0.001  0.001  
         (-0.98)  (0.54)  
# Observations 248,258 182,640 182,640 114,794 114,794 87,365 87,365 232,236 232,236 50,861 
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Note: This table presents the results for quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of size and book-to-market adjusted cumulative returns in the 
60 trading days (one-quarter) following earnings announcements (CAR(2;60)) on earnings surprise (SUE), interaction of SUE with the 
conglomerate dummy, (Conglo), and the interaction of SUE with a set of control variables, as well as the conglomerate dummy and the set of 
control variables themselves. The control variables include market-to-book (MB), size (Size), institutional ownership (IO), a quarterly loss 
dummy that takes on a value of one when the firm incurs losses (Loss), a measure of transaction costs (Amihud), the number of analysts (# 
Analysts) and where appropriate we also control for time-varying earnings persistence (EP) a la Chen (2013), textual complexity (FOG) a la 
Li (2008), analyst responsiveness (DRESP), and earnings volatility (EarnVol). Detailed definitions of all control variables are in the Data 
Appendix. The t-statistics use Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and are reported below each 
coefficient in Italic font and in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1977 to December 2010. The sample excludes firms with 
market caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX size quintile. The number of firm-quarters used in the analyses is abbreviated as # Observations.  
 
. 
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Table 10 
Robustness: Accounting for Non-Linearity in SUE and Using Alternative CAR Measures in PEAD Regressions 
                      
 Carhart Alphas  Winsorized SUE  SUE as Decile Rank 
Complexity Measure 
1 
(Conglo) 
2 
(Comp) 
3  
(NSeg) 
 4 
(Conglo) 
5 
(Comp) 
6  
(NSeg) 
 7 
(Conglo) 
8 
(Comp) 
9  
(NSeg) 
SUE 0.401 0.404 0.361 
 
0.759 0.762 0.630 
 
0.031 0.032 0.023  
(3.16) (3.12) (2.85) 
 
(5.62) (5.44) (4.59) 
 
(4.74) (5.09) (2.98) 
SUE* Complexity 0.129 0.338 0.060  0.194 0.490 0.127  0.013 0.023 0.008 
 (2.18) (2.42) (1.89)  (1.85) (1.90) (2.15)  (2.30) (1.64) (2.71) 
SUE*MB -0.352 -0.414 -0.453  -1.770 -1.792 -1.840  0.011 0.010 0.010 
 (-0.96) (-1.02) (-1.14)  (-1.96) (-1.96) (-1.98)  (1.14) (0.96) (1.05) 
SUE*Size 0.088 0.067 0.072  0.023 0.018 0.022  -0.045 -0.045 -0.049 
 (0.79) (0.55) (0.62)  (0.26) (0.19) (0.24)  (-1.92) (-1.86) (-2.03) 
SUE*IO 0.006 0.005 0.007  -0.071 -0.072 -0.070  -0.015 -0.015 -0.014 
 (0.23) (0.21) (0.03)  (-1.74) (-1.73) (-1.71)  (-2.26) (-2.24) (-2.13) 
SUE*Loss -0.146 -0.151 -0.163  -0.299 -0.299 -0.303  -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 
 (-2.62) (-2.57) (-2.77)  (-3.17) (-3.16) (-3.19)  (-2.82) (-2.83) (-2.89) 
SUE*Amihud 0.981 1.022 1.037  1.467 1.466 1.482  -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 
 (2.82) (2.95) (2.95)  (2.97) (2.96) (3.03)  (-0.17) (-0.25) (-0.24) 
SUE*# Analysts -0.077 -0.061 -0.067  -0.196 -0.192 -0.192  -0.025 -0.025 -0.024 
 (-2.28) (-1.65) (-1.82)  (-4.19) (-3.97) (-3.64)  (-2.55) (-2.54) (-2.44) 
Complexity -0.005 -0.010 -0.003  -0.000 -0.001 -0.000  -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 
 (-2.36) (-2.01) (-2.72)  (-0.19) (-0.22) (-0.21)  (-0.53) (-1.29) (-0.63) 
MB 0.000 0.001 0.000  0.018 0.019 0.018  0.015 0.015 0.015 
 (0.07) (0.26) (0.02)  (1.51) (1.51) (1.52)  (3.20) (3.13) (3.17) 
Size -0.002 -0.002 -0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001  0.037 0.037 0.037 
 (-1.56) (-1.56) (-1.27)  (0.52) (0.51) (0.58)  (2.96) (3.01) (3.03) 
IO 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.002 0.002 0.002  0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (1.12) (1.02) (1.00)  (1.68) (1.62) (1.63)  (1.32) (1.24) (1.26) 
Loss -0.008 -0.009 -0.009  -0.011 -0.011 -0.011  -0.018 -0.018 -0.010 
 (-2.19) (-2.28) (-2.29)  (-2.29) (-2.31) (-2.30)  (-2.83) (-2.83) (-2.29) 
Amihud 0.046 0.047 0.048  0.029 0.031 0.030  0.026 0.026 0.026 
 (1.99) (1.96) (1.95)  (1.57) (1.55) (1.55)  (2.29) (2.29) (2.29) 
# Analysts 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.004 0.004 0.004  0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (0.50) (0.49) (0.51)  (2.61) (2.60) (2.59)  (2.02) (1.97) (2.00) 
# Observations 113,173 113,173 113,173  113,470 113,470 113,470  113,470 113,470 113,470 
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Note: This table presents the results for quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of firm-specific Carhart alphas in the 60 trading days (one-
quarter) following earnings announcements αC(2;60)) on earnings surprise (SUE), interactions of SUE with three different measures of 
innate business complexity (Conglo, Comp and Nseg), the interaction of SUE with a recurring set of standard controls (Size. MB, IO, Loss, 
Amihud, # Analysts) as well as the controls themselves. Columns one to three use the baseline definition of SUE (winsorized at 99.5% and 
0.5% percentile), columns four to six winsorize SUE at 95% and 5% percentile, columns seven to nine transform SUE into decile ranks. 
Detailed descriptions of all variables are in the Data Appendix. The t-statistics use Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation and are reported below each coefficient in Italic font and in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1977 to 
December 2010. The sample excludes firms with market caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX size quintile. The number of firm-quarters used 
in the analyses is abbreviated as # Observations.  
 
 
 
 
